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Abstract
This study reports the findings of a systematic visual content analysis of 356
randomly sampled images published about the Iraq War in Time, Newsweek, and U.S.
News and World Report from 2003-2009. In comparison to a 1995 Gulf War study,
published images in all three newsmagazines continued to be U.S.-centric, with the
highest content frequencies reflected in the categories U.S. troops on combat patrol, Iraqi
civilians, and U.S. political leaders respectively. These content categories do not
resemble the results of the Gulf War study in which armaments garnered the largest share
of the images with 23%.
This study concludes that embedding photojournalists, in addition to media
economics, governance, and the media-organizational culture, restricted an accurate
representation of the Iraq War and its consequences. Embedding allowed more access to
both troops and civilians than the journalistic pool system of the Gulf War, which
stationed the majority of journalists in Saudi Arabia and allowed only a few journalists
into Iraq with the understanding they would share information. However, the perceived
opportunity by journalists to more thoroughly cover the war through the policy of
embedding was not realized to the extent they had hoped for. The embed protocols acted
more as an indirect form of censorship.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
A critique is not a matter of saying that things are not right as they are. It is a
matter of pointing out on what kinds of assumptions, what kinds of familiar,
unchallenged, unconsidered modes of thought the practices that we accept rest.
~ Michel Foucault (1981)
It seems almost perverse to have a personal fascination with war photography. I
have a certain guilt associated with viewing images of humans in extremis. Even the
Latin is a way to distance myself from what I do, which is actually to look at photographs
of the maimed and dead, the displaced, the abandoned as well as the rubble and human
cost of war. There is something about the representations of war and what I feel is
missing, that must be there beyond the camera’s view that draws me in. It might simply
be the question of how we continue to believe that war can be an honorable endeavor,
particularly when we see and are aware of our own culpability in the perpetration of its
life-altering pain and suffering. My brother served during the Vietnam War and I was
distraught at the thought he might be killed and I would never see him again. There are
many families that have experienced the heartache and fear and also the pride of having a
family member enlist or be drafted. Stories of war, movies about war, and photographs of
war depict acts of heroism as a defining war experience, yet soldiers themselves claim
they do not feel like “heroes.” Stories of the special camaraderie of fellow servicemen
and women that is never surpassed outside the military are common. Over the years I
have come to understand that conflating war and heroism is a mistake. Heroism, acts of
courage, and bravery are certainly present during wartime, but they are not only
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experiences of war. Heroism is part of a narrative surrounding war that serves a purpose
for a stakeholder. Much more realistic, or holistic, is a representation of war as a cost to
the environment and all beings—and heroism is a spandrel, or byproduct, of a desperate
situation. I suspect there are other cultural narratives in our depictions of war for which
the photograph acts as proof or evidence. In this sense photographs do not represent
“war” per se, but rather are selected to represent our myths about war or our narrative
interests. The term “war” has become an indexical attribution of meaning, a process of
bracketing an event and separating it from its context so that in future references to the
event, the “meaning” that was originally derived from the event “becomes” the event
instead of a part of a complex series of interrelated events. This points to a practice of
contemporary journalism to report episodically without a broader causal anchoring
(Iyengar, 1991). In this way, the indexicalization of events become evidence of the
meaning of war, thus conflating causal and indexing processes (Tuchman, 1978).
It is all the more important to recognize and deepen the understanding of the
human cost of war when what is represented in the media does not frame it as a human
endeavor, but focuses instead on the technological innovations and means of war or
textual and visual tropes about war that have been culturally anchored in the war
narrative. In a study of the 1991 Gulf War, Griffin and Lee (1995) found that 23% of
pictorial coverage focused on weapons systems and technology. This was a significant
change from previous wars, and one that literally replaced the percentage of imagery
traditionally dedicated to warfare with images of “American military technology and
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power” (Griffin & Lee, 1995, p. 817). I replicated and extended Griffin and Lee’s content
analysis of Gulf War images by performing a content analysis of images representing the
Iraq War. The study was conducted in two stages. First, the content analysis of manifest
content of media images was coded, and the results of the coding were compared with the
original study to see whether the predominance of armament coverage discovered by
Griffin and Lee continued for the Iraq War. Second, the content frequencies that emerged
from the content analysis were interpreted as a discursive archive of a journalistic
institution (Rose, 2001, p. 164), a visual culture particular to that institution’s structure
and procedures with implications for our contemporary understanding of war.
First, I review the literature on framing, and war and the media in particular,
situating my study as an empirical study replicating and extending the 1995 Gulf War
study conducted by Griffin and Lee. I detail the methodology and results of Griffin and
Lee’s study, and the implications suggested by the resultant findings. I then discuss how I
collected and coded the images of the Iraq War, how I analyzed the resultant data set, and
discuss the implications of the results.
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Chapter 2: Review of Literature
The first things we see when we read an article are the images related to the story.
Eye-tracking studies suggest that the most dominant photograph on a page is the point at
which attention is directed first, with visually salient and larger photographs leading a
reader into a story (Olk & Kappas, 2011; Smith, 2005). Images have the power to draw
us into the story and in conjunction with the headlines and captions help to frame how we
interpret and make meaning of the subject matter. Because photographs lack formal
propositional syntax, that anchors an image to only one particular meaning (Borah,
2009), images can be persuasive rhetorical tools in support of many different texts and in
activating cultural schemata (Newton, 2001; Perlmutter, 1998). Therefore war
photography is not a transparent medium, it is a moment in time onto which meaning is
constructed or vested. Framing is a practice through which meaning can be assigned to a
photograph through text, and also a methodology through which photography can be
analyzed for meaning construction.
Framing Literature
Framing theory and framing research have developed over the past decade by
reflexively defining and refining what framing is as a communication theory and
methodological approach (Tannen, 1993). Researchers have yet to agree on how to define
and research framing. Some confusion stems from the inability to agree on a consistent
vocabulary and the resultant ambiguity in a term’s meaning, and part of the confusion
seems to stem from a shift in level of analysis—from meta-analyses to individual case
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studies. Framing as a research theory is also conflated with framing as a methodology. It
seems clear from the multiple models proposed that it is a concept that is still being
defined. According to Entman (1993), to “frame” is to:
Select some aspects of a perceived reality and make [it] more salient
in a communicating test, in such a way as to promote a particular
problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or
treatment recommendation for the item described. (p. 52)
As a general definition upon which to expand, a frame includes structures,
processes, intentions, and goals that contribute to the construction of a frame.
Framing research attempts to make those elements and mechanisms transparent
by examining: how frames are sponsored by political actors (Andsager, 2000;
Coleman, Hartley & Kennamer, 2006; Snow, Rochford, Worden, & Benford,
1986); how media processes construct and constrain media frames (Cook, 1983;
Iyengar, 1991; Mintz & Redd, 2004; Molotch & Lester, 1975); and how publics
are affected by a frame in their interpretation and decision-making (Entman,
1993; Gamson, 1992; Price, Tewksbury & Powers, 1997; Scheufele, 2004;
Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).
D’Angelo (2002) suggests that there are some general assumptions about framing
that most media scholars accept: (a) that media frames amalgamate text and image with a
framing device of contextualization that is either episodic or thematic (Iyengar, 1991); or
(b) that a mass media frame involves conflict, human interest, or consequences. Framing
is a term used to describe the processes of meaning-making by media and other social
and political organizations through the selection, omission, and construction of
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communicating messages for the purpose of influencing an individual’s perception of an
event or issue. Whether a particular frame is consciously constructed for rhetorical
purposes, or emerges unconsciously as a reflection of cultural values, framing operates in
complex ways. Framing research seeks to make the structure and processes of frame
construction transparent, because much of the power of a frame is in its ability to escape
detection by the public it influences. A useful way to think about framing is in the
manner that D’Angelo (2002) outlines in his meta-analysis of framing research.
D’Angelo (2002) classified types of framing research into three paradigms that reflect
specific researchers’ attitudes and beliefs toward how frames are constructed and how the
effects are exhibited. These distinct research paradigms examine evidence in text and
images in specific ways, which he names the constructionist, the critical, and the
cognitive framing paradigms (D’Angelo, 2002, pp. 876-878). Scholars agree on four
basic goals for framing research, but may disagree on how and why a frame is generated
and what constitutes measurable effects. The four primary goals are: (a) to identify
thematic units called frames which are based on the content of the text or image being
investigated; (b) to investigate the antecedent conditions that produce frames which may
exist as unquestioned cultural assumptions; (c) to examine the effects of news frames by
analyzing how news frames interact with established schemata on an individual and
social level; and (d) to examine how news frames shape public debate and social
processes (D’Angelo, 2002, p. 873).
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Constructionist Framing
Gamson and Modigliani (1989) claim that journalists process information by
creating “interpretive packages” that reflect the interests of different sources invested in
the message. Further, they conceptualize process and structure as distinct from content
and its effects on publics. They place framing with a constructionist framework, which
generates a frame’s interpretive package through “the use of metaphor, catchphrases,
visual images, moral appeals and other symbolic devices that characterize the discourse”
(Gamson & Modigliani, 1989, p. 2). An interpretive package makes sense of events and
gives meaning to them by indicating what is at stake.
Fundamental to the production of interpretive packages is whether the theme is
deeply embedded within the culture as an organizing theme, how interest-bearers
(Molotch & Lester, 1975) or sponsors (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989) promote the
interpretive package, and how media practices influence the dissemination through
frequency of coverage, news values such as conflict, human interest and consequence
reporting (Neuman, Just, & Crigler, 1992). Gamson and Modigliani (1989) suggest that
the most successful interpretive packages over time are those that can assimilate new
events into schemata or constructs already operating within the culture—something that
resonates within the cultural psyche of a nation and is then used as an organizing theme.
Many organizing constructs are embedded in the American cultural discourse, some of
which are modeled as two opposing sides of a dialectic such as the technological progress
versus nature construct, or the personal freedom versus social dependence construct. This
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“shared public vocabulary” (Andsager, 2000, p. 578) enables a frame and occasionally a
plurality of frames to compete for dominance on an issue (Coleman, Hartley, &
Kennamer, 2006). In addition, part of the framing process involves ascribing causal
consequences to the frame or the opposing frames (Snow et al., 1986).
Constructionist researchers believe that journalistic frames are of practical use to
a public needing to form opinions and make decisions about issues of the day (D’Angelo,
2002, p. 877). However, researchers using this interpretive model also assume that
journalists limit the range of information due to a journalistic convention that privileges
official sources, such as the government, as the most knowledgeable. The dominance of a
frame in the media is therefore influenced by a stakeholder’s access to media (Carragee
& Roefs, 2004), frequency of coverage, emotional valence of the message, and the
absence of contextualization through additional stakeholders’ frames (Andsager, 2000;
Coleman et al., 2006; Cook et al., 1983; Molotch & Lester, 1975). This study assumes a
constructionist theoretical perspective influenced by news routines and processing so that
the reality constructed by the media is weighted in favor of certain meaning constructions
and not others. For example, framing has a boundary setting function. One instance
related to the first Gulf War showed that spokespersons for U.S. policy were successful in
limiting the choice of frame options to a retributive frame necessitating punishment
despite antiwar protester’s attempts to expand the available frames to other forms of
redress, namely reparation or negotiation (Lakoff, 1996; Pan & Kosicki, 2001). The
defining or framing function serves to activate journalistic norms and conventions of
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interpretation that are both shared and recognizable by readers (Pan & Kosicki, 2001;
Zelizer, 2004). It sets up a shared “discursive community by differentiating actors,
actions and action settings to ‘act out’ its discursive and sociological binding” (Pan &
Kosicki, 2001, p. 42).
Critical Framing
The critical paradigm as defined by D’Angelo (2002) also has some theoretical
insight when considering news frame creation. Carragee and Roefs (2004) examine what
components of a frame influence public attitudes. It is their contention that it is not only
frame content, but also in whose interests content is constructed that bears examination.
Stakeholder processes that get reported in the media tend to be dominated by those
entities with the most access to the media. This process is separate from the construction
of the frame, yet greatly influences what is reported. In general, stakeholders—whether
from political elites or grass-roots social movements (Snow et al., 1980)—attempt to
claim an ideological perspective through a process of deflecting resistance to a frame.
The process includes strategies to incorporate or weaken alternate perspectives, and a
constant delimiting, defending, and modification of, a frame (Carragee & Roefs, 2004).
Likewise, scholars who work within the critical and constructionist paradigms
“claim that frames are the outcome of newsgathering routines by which journalists
convey information about issues and events from the perspective of values held by
politician and economic elites” (D’Angelo, 2002, p. 876). Framing practices that omit
other information in order to support a narrow description of what is at issue bypass
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alternative frames and possibly alternative stakeholders (Coleman et al., 2006). A frame
constructs a particular meaning and specific way of analyzing possible entailments while
ignoring others. It seeks to gain adherents through aligning certain values and beliefs
within a particular frame’s definition. Very often these values and beliefs represent the
most powerful stakeholders because they are the ones that have survived and succeeded
in developing a shared public vocabulary. In studying the framing process as a result of a
“meaning war” (Carragee & Roefs, 2004, p. 222) between stakeholders, researchers can
trace and make transparent the “relationship between news and the distribution of power
in American society” (p. 222). Carragee and Roefs (2004) insist that studies on framing
have neglected political power as a sponsoring source for frames, leading to an absence
of transparency regarding the influence of powerful sources. Thus, contrary to other
framing paradigms, the authors do not believe that frames can be simply explored as a
“content feature” (Carragee & Roefs, 2004, p. 225) that produce media effects, but must
also question in whose interests those effects are to be produced.
War and the Media
Culler (1997) suggests that meaning is created through a wide variety of
discursive practices within a culture (p. 5), practices that include textual and symbolic
language, historical assumptions and practices, and discourse through which meaning is
continually negotiated. In this study therefore, with the topic of war, images are part of a
series of cultural discursive practices that extend beyond a simple definition of war as a
state of armed conflict between different nations or states, but include social and cultural
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practices, war mythologies, and conceptual assumptions about war that have persisted
over time and define the boundaries of war as a narrative (Culler, 1997). Particularly in
media depictions of war, where photographs are primarily used to illustrate text, and
occasionally provide the story themselves, a study of visual imagery, usually thought to
document and provide information about war might echo a representational social
discourse about war rather than photojournalistic evidence of the particular war itself
(Culler, 1997; Zelizer, 2004).
Because the nature of photography is to frame and frames exclude, the manifest
content of a photograph, and its reproduction and proliferation, becomes important
evidence of how this discourse is shaped (Griffin & Lee, 1995; Sontag, 2002; Tankard,
2001). Frames can be manifest in visual documents such as films, political posters,
recruiting materials, and photographic representations of war. The study of war imagery
can reveal how the media pictures war and can also reveal gaps in manifest content that
historically were part of the war discourse and may have disappeared, thus making visual
studies of war an important component to the study of how war is represented overall,
and how war coverage changes over time (Reese & Lewis, 2009).
The scholarly literature studying war and how the media have contributed to a
war discourse consists of two types of investigation: (a) commentary and criticism with
deep assumptions of institutional mechanisms and processes from both a political and
media perspective; and (b) empirical research studying how recent wars are framed both
textually and visually in comparison to past wars and conflicts. As exemplified by studies
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on the Gulf War by Hallin and Gitlin (1993) and the Iraq War by King and Lester (2005),
and Fahmy and Johnson (2005), studies are performed on a limited period of time or
important isolated events of a war (Fahmy & Kim, 2008). Few, if any, studies bridge the
textual/visual divide, offering an analysis that covers both image and text over an
extended period of time.
Many of the empirical studies compare media coverage of current wars to those of
previous wars, noting changes in information technology as well as media production
values and processes that influence, in the case of imagery, what is made visible to the
public. Factors affecting production values could include decisions regarding the amount
of time and money to dedicate to a certain issue and the prominence it holds for the
public. Within this literature, media scholars examine how media coverage of war is
framed and through what processes that framing is accomplished (Gowing, 2003; Thussu,
2003; Weber, 2003). My study aligns itself within the tradition of war studies focusing on
a comparison of pictorial coverage during the Gulf War to subsequent changes in
coverage during the war in Iraq and how the imagery helped to frame the Iraq War in
2003.
War Imagery
War imagery is intimately connected to war photographers. As Tim Page, a war
photographer, says in an interview, “Every good war picture becomes an anti-war picture.
You are not making anti-war statements, but the fact that you have made a good war
picture means that it becomes an anti-war statement” (Tee, 2011). War photography, like
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all great news photography, captures a moment in time that is symbolic, surprising,
memorable,
emorable, dramatic, and aesthetically appealing (Nöth, 2011; Zelizer, 2004).

Figure 1. Samuel Aranda (photographer),
The New York Times,, World Press Photo
12, pp. 6-7.

Figure 2.. Yuri Kozyrev
(photographer), in Time 161(16)
4.21.03, pp. 38-39.

The above prize-winning
winning photographs exhibit many of the qualities of great news
photography. The photograph on the left by photojournalist Samuel Aranda pictures
Fatima al-Qaws
Qaws cradling her son, Zayed, in Yemen after he succumbed to tear gas during
durin
a protest against the Saleh government. The posture is reminiscent of Christian
representations of the pieta
pieta. The use of the posture emphasizes a symbolic cultural theme
to dramatically
ally illustrate the universality of a grieving mother whether Christian or
o
Muslim. Through this conjunction it becomes a great photograph (Figure 1). The
photograph on the right, was a 2003 World Press Photo winner by photographer, Yuri
Kozyrev. The juxtaposition of the little boy looking at the image of an American Barbie
painted
ted on a wardrobe door symbolizes the military and cultural invasion taking place at
the time of the photo (Figure 2)
2). At first glance the photo is charming, while expressing a
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memorable and cynical perspective of the war. However, inclusion of war images into
news coverage is not only about memorable and prize-winning photographs. Particularly
in newsmagazines that now include access to online compendiums of photographs
attached to an article, coverage is aggregated, with a series of photographs grouped to
complete a story, or offer aspects of a particular event, such as a battle, or multiple details
concerning an issue such as the legal and moral arguments surrounding the use of torture.
The reason that images can be the subject matter of social science is that they can
reveal basic underlying, and very often unconscious, assumptions or paradigms from
which we operate (Wagner, 2011). Those assumptions will leak out into our symbolic
forms, such as photography, to create meaning (Thompson, 1990). The power and robust
nature of photography to appeal to the emotions is the result of parallel features of
photography as both a denotative and connotative vehicle of meaning. Within journalism,
its denotative function seems to take precedence with its ability to depict the world
“realistically” and the requisite association to truth-values, representation, and
indexicality. However, it is impossible to disentangle connotative functions from
denotative functions of photography, as photographs simultaneously tap into symbolic
language associated with universality and generalizability (Hall, 1974; Sekula, 1984 in
Zelizer, 2004, p. 117).
Media use of imagery increases significantly during wartime, and, after
September 11, 2001, sometimes doubled in newspapers and newsmagazines. This trend
continued with the Gulf War in 1991, the war in Afghanistan in 2002, and the Iraq War in
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2003 (Zelizer, 2004). This trend toward the visual is enhanced by online repositories of
images to expand what is available in the printed versions of newspapers and
newsmagazines. However, this does not necessarily indicate that more topical
information about a war is being made available to publics, because many of the
photographs represent familiar tropes without specific information that would
contextualize the photographs to thematic reference points of the war (Zelizer, 2004, p.
121).
Access and Censorship
The military has required and the media has complied with censorship protocols
regarding publication of photographs of American dead during most wars in which the
U.S. has been involved. The U.S. had been at war for 21 months in WWII before images
of dead soldiers appeared in print. The strict censorship of WWI was relaxed during
WWII and photographers were allowed onto the battlefield. They could photograph what,
when, and how they wanted. However, those photographs were censored both in the field
and again in Washington before release. At the beginning of the war, the delays in
publication could be as long as 4 months, but after the invasion of Normandy, the Allies
were winning and publication was swift despite military censorship (Kobré, 2008, p.
447). Photographs of dead or mutilated soldiers were placed in a secret Pentagon file
called the “Chamber of Horrors” (Kobré, 2008, p. 446). Censors were worried that if
Americans saw pictures of the dead, that they would press for compromise settlements
with Germany and Japan. However, later in the war, when the government felt that the
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American public had become too complacent due to all the reporting of Allied victories,
they did release some of these photographs.
There were opposing viewpoints to censorship—that withholding photographs
was treating the public like children, or the view that too much photography of war was
unhealthy for the viewer. Interestingly, “the censors held back any pictures showing
racial conflicts at American bases, and other visual evidence of disunity or disorder”
(Kobré, 2008, p. 446). Following the surrender of Hitler, photographers were present
with the troops at the opening of concentration camps throughout Europe. Many
members of the public did not believe the written reports of the scenes of mass graves
and emaciated corpses encountered in the camps. Once the photographs were published
however, the public was shocked at the extent of the annihilation of targeted groups such
as Jews, homosexuals, and gypsies (Kobré, 2008, p. 447).
During the Korean War, General MacArthur allowed photographers to selfcensor, until American forces began to retreat. At that point he imposed full and absolute
military censorship. However, even before full censorship, only 5% of the self-censored
photographs included combat photos. This percentage is far lower that the 22% combat
photos that were published during the war in Vietnam, and the 24% that showed brief
glimpses of American dead and wounded (Hallin, 1986, p. 129). A more developed
system of accreditation of journalists combined with no military censorship was a new
development during Vietnam. Correspondents and photojournalists were given the
freedom to report, photograph, and transmit anything they wanted aside from sensitive
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strategic military operations, troop movements, and body counts. The press exercised
self-censorship more often than the military enforced it by withdrawing accreditation. A
more subtle form of censorship was exercised through the dependence of reporters for
transportation by military helicopters through the jungle (Moeller, 1989, p. 361).
Although photographs of the dead and wounded on both sides were taken, relatively little
reached the American public despite lack of military censorship at the time. Exceptions
did occur as in a critical and shocking report by Morley Safer in 1965 that filmed the
destruction of the Vietnamese village Cam Ne by American marines. But this was by no
means the rule. To the consternation of reporters and photojournalists, a substantial
amount of “news management” (Moeller, 1989, p. 363) was attempted by the government
and practiced by media organizations alike.
It has been claimed that the relative freedom of photojournalists during the
Vietnam War and the subsequent negative response by American audiences to graphic
images of war was responsible for the American pullout from Vietnam. Media scholars
deny that claim (Griffin, 1995, 2004, 2010; Hallin, 1986), and suggest that visual images
may have an impact of their own, but it is more likely that publics were explicitly told
what they were seeing (Hallin, 1986; Sontag, 1973, 2003). Although many other wars
have occurred during the Cold War era (1945-1991), and post Cold War (1991-2001) era,
the First Gulf War and subsequent post 9/11 wars in Afghanistan and Iraq garner the
most interest from mass media scholars.
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The Gulf War
During the Gulf War (August 1990–February 1991) media coverage of the
conflict was heavily censored by the military. Most coverage was reported based on
briefings organized by the military. A small group of journalists was allowed access to
individual soldiers, but only if they were accompanied by an officer and subject to prior
approval and subsequent editing. General coverage was accomplished through the pool
system, with a small number of journalists allowed into Iraq, sharing photographs and
reports while the majority of journalists were stationed in Saudi Arabia. This level of
censorship was a significant change from coverage during the Vietnam War when U.S.
military censorship was practically nonexistent (Moeller, 1989, p. 363). Despite this
censorship, coverage during the commencement of coalition hostilities recurred in a
twenty-four hour per day, seven days a week news cycle of the Cable News Network
(CNN). CNN broadcast uninterrupted visuals related to the war repeating the same
images over and over again, and later referred to as “techno-imagery” (Griffin & Lee,
1995, p. 83).
The Gulf War differentiates itself in another way from previous wars in that it was
the first war following the Vietnam War to have been fought with a professional U.S.
military as opposed to one comprised of both professional soldiers and draftees, as were
WWI, WWII, Korea, and Vietnam wars. The death count of coalition troops during the
Gulf War in 1991 was relatively low compared to other wars, including the later Iraq War
of 2003. The low body count was most probably due to the short period of conflict in
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which the coalition troops were involved in the Gulf War (January 17, 1991– February
28, 1991). Civilian deaths are notably higher than military deaths in all wars. The Project
on Defense Alternatives estimates that the ratio of Iraqi combatant and noncombatant
deaths during the first three months of the Gulf War compared to the first three months of
the Iraq War were almost indistinguishable despite being fought with completely
different goals in mind. The proximate goal of the Gulf War was to expel the invading
Iraqi military from Kuwait, and that of the Iraq War was to effect regime change
(Conetta, 2003). U.S. Department of Defense statistics for total U.S. military deaths
attributed to the Iraq War is 4,409, with 31,924 wounded as of May 4, 2012 (U.S. Dept.
of Defense, 2012). The U.S. Department of Defense does not provide casualty figures for
Iraqi combatants or noncombatants. Tentative figures of violent deaths of noncombatants
compiled from verifiable death records by a nonprofit U.K./U.S. organization is
estimated to be about 116,000 as of January 2012. These figures are significantly lower
than previous wars such as World War II (CBS, 2005) and Vietnam (Hirschman, Preston,
& Loi, 1995) that had civilian fatalities in the millions.
Particularly with military wounded, the survival rate increases as medical
technologies enable medical personnel to save lives that earlier would have certainly been
added to the lists of the deceased. This leads to military personnel with enduring traumas
such as amputations or traumatic brain injuries. Still, the statistics for the U.S. military
wounded in action does not approach the statistics from the previous wars, with U.S.
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wounded in Vietnam reaching above 153,000 compared to the 32,000 of the Iraq War
(U.S. Department of Defense, 2012).
Griffin and Lee (1995) questioned whether the perception of the Gulf War as a
war witnessed first-hand was indeed reflected in the images used to represent the war.
They were spurred by earlier studies of the Vietnam War that belied popular perceptions
of the Vietnam War as a “living room war,” during which combat was covered in the
field, documenting the human cost of war. Those studies, including the later
comprehensive study by Hallin (1986) showed that contrary to popular opinion, the
coverage was remarkably restrained given the lack of censorship (p. 131). The same
question motivated Griffin and Lee to ask a similar question about the Gulf War, namely,
whether what was popularly considered to be a war that the public witnessed first-hand
on television, was reflected in the images the public saw. Their content analysis of three
news magazines revealed that contrary to popular opinion and claims by CNN that the
coverage was “live,” only the initial days of the war provided “live” coverage after which
coverage “reproduced traditional patterns of war imagery much like those . . . in high
school history textbooks” (Griffin & Lee, 1995, p. 821). Griffin and Lee (1995) quote
Perlmutter’s visual study of high school textbooks in which photographs are described as
predominantly U.S. centered and focused on action. Perlmutter also found that the action
shots were either staged or inauthentic and that editors avoided images depicting death,
injury, or implied death such as funerals (Griffin & Lee, 1995; Perlmutter, 1992).
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One of the concerns expressed by Griffin and Lee (1995) was whether the public
was seeing images taken in the field. Were the published photographs depictions of actual
events as they were happening, or did they tend to be symbolic representations of nations,
cultural attitudes, and military power? If the photos depicted on-the-scene events of
specific places and events occurring in the Gulf, then Griffin and Lee (1995) believed
that the media were doing their job. However, if the images were symbolic
representations of war, then media were not providing timely information, and coverage
could not be thought of as a reliable record of the war. Symbolic representations are
typically thought to support enduring symbolic concepts—in this case those related to the
Middle East, Arab culture, military power, and the presidency (Griffin & Lee, 1995; Pan,
Ostman, Moy, & Reynolds, 1994). Likewise, assessing the frequencies of on-site combat
photographs could confirm complaints from journalists about “military censorship and
limited access to war zones” (Griffin & Lee, 1995, p. 815) by comparing it to journalistic
access and censorship during other wars.
Another concern of Griffin and Lee’s was to respond to complaints the media
promoted the Gulf War. Therefore, in some of their categories they tried to capture how
often Allied troops were depicted, and whether and in what ways Iraq’s forces were
depicted. Finally, with the example of the Vietnam War, Griffin and Lee wanted to see if
coverage would include evidence of the discourse surrounding a war such as images of
civilian casualties, damage and destruction, and depictions of antiwar demonstrations
(Griffin & Lee, 1995).
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The content analysis results showed that 6 out of the final 36 categories accounted
for more than half of the 1,104 images coded. The largest image genre in each individual
news magazine consisted of images of military hardware, such as photographs or
illustrations of planes, ships, tanks, missiles, and weapon guidance systems. These
images were stand-alone photographs, illustrations, and schematics—some reproduced
from arms catalogues or provided by the Department of Defense or arms manufacturers.
They did not include images in which the armaments were part of the image content for a
combat photograph, which were coded as the combat genre. For every photograph of
direct combat (3% of the total), there were nine images of the American military arsenal.
The original category included subdivisions that would include armaments from all
Allied countries and the opposition. However, the coverage focused overwhelmingly on
American armaments and military capability (Griffin & Lee, 1995).
The second most frequent category consisted of photographs of troops, and
included American, Allied, and Iraqi troops in noncombat situations. Griffin and Lee
(1995) made an assumption that the public would be seeing images from both American
and Allied troops, because President George H.W. Bush’s response to Iraq’s invasion of
Kuwait was based on U.N. resolutions and a multinational coalition of troops. The
complete category comprised 14% of the total photographs coded. However, within that
14%, U.S. troops were pictured 95% of the time, Allied (Saudi, Kuwait) soldiers and
pilots comprised 2% of the total, and 3% pictured Iraqi soldiers. Two aspects of this
coverage are noteworthy. First, that the second most frequent category is comprised of
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behind the scene photographs of troops, many taken before the war in preparation for
combat and virtually replacing coverage of soldiers in combat, typical of previous war
coverage. Second, reportage shows an overwhelming dominance of coverage of U.S.
troops to the exclusion of Allied troops and with a total of five photographs of Iraqi
troops.
The third most frequent category of coverage included Western political (7%) and
military leaders (5%) comprising 12% of the total coverage. Again, the coverage was
predominantly U.S. centered. Photographs of Iraqi political leaders (4%) were comprised
almost exclusively of photographs of Saddam Hussein in an equal amount to photographs
of George H.W. Bush. Photographs of Bush and Hussein were often positioned opposite
one another on one page or a double page spread facing each other as if the conflict was a
personal confrontation between two leaders (Griffin & Lee, 1995; Hallin & Gitlin, 1993).
Coverage of American political and military leaders was more varied, including
congressional leaders and various military commanders. However, Saddam Hussein was
the exclusive representative of Iraqi political and military leaders except for one picture
of Tariq Aziz, Iraq’s Prime Minister. There were no Iraqi military leaders pictured at all
(Griffin & Lee, 1995, p. 118).
The categories “military armaments,” “unengaged troops,” and “political and
military leaders” comprised 57% of the image genres in Time, Newsweek and US News
and World Report. They were the top three image genres across news magazines and
within each news magazine. According to Griffin and Lee (1995), this coverage
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emphasized U.S. firepower by cataloging the arsenal with an overwhelming 249 images
compared to 40 images of Iraqi weaponry. This coverage also focused predominantly on
noncombat troops (158 images) with 38 pictures of U.S. troops in combat. In contrast,
there are only five pictures of Iraqi soldiers, which leave them literally and
metaphorically unseen. When the enemy is reduced to a stereotype, they are
metaphorically unseen because the images “reinforce prevailing news narratives rather
than contribute independent or unique visual information” (Griffin, 2005, p. 399).
Photographs that present a more nuanced image of the “enemy” are available of course,
but they are not used within the discourse about war. The predominance of images of
U.S. political and military leaders, contrasted with a visually ill-defined enemy, or
visually defined through one image of Saddam Hussein, sets up a conceptual
juxtaposition of a plural U.S. society fighting against a monolithic state with one single
dictatorial enemy (Griffin & Lee, 1995, p. 818).
Griffin and Lee (1995) argue that the content analysis identified elements of the
Gulf War that remained invisible and therefore did not become part of the discourse of
war. Much of that information is revealed in the gaps between coverage of previous wars
and coverage of the Gulf War. The most obvious gap is the replacement of images of
combat with images related to U.S. armaments. Equally, the lack of portrayals of the
human cost of war, whether it is casualties, deaths, or damage and destruction has the
effect of distancing the viewer from the consequences of war. This is in no way unusual
in the Western tradition of war iconography (Perlmutter, 1992). However, this distancing
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has political and cultural consequences, promoting an inaccurate and sanitized version of
war’s reality. Scholars, journalists, and philosophers have commented about the
implications of an inaccurate understanding of war and its consequences. Hallin and
Gitlin (1993) point out that war typically has a “narrative logic full of suspense,
crescendos, and collective emotion” (p. 422), which lends itself to myth making. The
idealized and romantic mythologies associated with World War II gave way to a more
ambiguous and controversial set of mythologies after the war in Vietnam and those myths
are reflected in movies made about those conflicts (Hallin & Gitlin, 1993). Ott, Aoki and
Dickinson (2011) suggest that framing weapons as “mechanical innovations—as objects
of scientific inquiry whose history can . . . be chronicled in a detached and disinterested
way” (p. 219) distances the viewer from the consequences and purpose of a weapon. This
corresponds with the types of images Griffin and Lee (1995) found catalogued in their
content analysis: photographs, illustrations, and schematics, some reproduced from arms
catalogues (p. 816).
Zelizer (2010) offers another way to view the preponderance of armaments in the
news magazine as images that presume death, such as pictures of the bombing of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6th and 9th, 1945, which only show a mushroom
cloud, but no death. The public saw the first images of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on
August 11th. At the time, the connection between the image of a mushroom cloud and the
loss of human life was unclear to a public for whom this was a new experience. Death
was presumed, but there was no previous reference point to serve as an example of the
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possible level of death and destruction. Therefore, during a period when the discourse
about nuclear armaments was developing, ambiguous images of a mushroom cloud
“disconnected the event from its impact” (Zelizer, 2010, p. 88). Likewise, images of
technological warfare, and armaments such as electronic targeting devices, imply death
without having to show actual images or assign agency to the destruction. It is left to the
imagination of the viewer to create a visual narrative. In this way, “images of presumed
death . . . provide multiple levels of distancing from the depiction of death itself”
(Zelizer, 2010, p. 77).
The Iraq War
Data from a content analysis cannot definitively assign meaning to the numbers,
but they can point out differences or gaps in coverage over time, and thus the changing
discourse and its possible implications. Griffin and Lee’s (1995) content analysis data
empirically demonstrate what other visual communication scholars mean when they refer
to the potential of images and the power of their repetition or absence to shape a
discourse of war.
According to several media scholars, one of the most prevalent factors defining
U.S. media coverage of war in the post 9/11 period is the policy of embedding journalists
with the military (Fahmy & Johnson, 2005; King & Lester, 2005; Kuypers & Cooper,
2005). Following complaints about access to combat zones during the Gulf War, the
military developed a policy of embedding journalists with the troops. With the new
policy of embedding during the Iraq War, the sheer scale of embedded journalists was
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unprecedented, with numbers above 600 at the onset of hostilities (Pfau, Haigh, Gettle,
Donnelly, Scott, Warr, & Wittenberg, 2005).
Embedding is defined by the military as “a media representative remaining with a
unit on an extended basis” to “facilitate in-depth coverage of U.S. forces in combat and
related operations” (Pfau et al., 2005, p. 74). According to empirical studies of media
coverage of the Iraq War by Pfau et al. (2005) and Fahmy and Johnson (2005), the embed
policy produced reporting that showed deep, rich coverage of individual combat units,
but was limited in its ability to contextualize to the broader goals or effectiveness of the
war. Journalists received the same training as the soldiers with whom they were being
embedded, and then were embedded for long periods of time, sometimes up to 6 months,
with a particular unit. The authors believe that the dependence on the military for food,
shelter, and protection, as well as the inevitable identification with the military forces,
tended to weight the reporting to a promilitary perspective (Pfau et al., 2005). Journalists
also occasionally used the first-person in narratives about developments of combat units,
placing themselves into the frame of the conflict, writing, “we took some casualties,” or
“we won that battle” (Gardner, 2008, p. 113). Fahmy and Johnson (2005) interviewed
journalists about the purported promilitary perspective. The journalists interviewed
reported that they balanced their awareness of a possible promilitary perspective with a
belief that the unprecedented access and detail afforded by embedding overrode any
concerns that their coverage jeopardized their ability to submit “accurate, trustworthy,
and fair” (Fahmy & Johnson, 2005, p. 311) stories. In fact, the journalists believed that
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non-embedded journalists could editorially offset any such subjectivity with a different
“slice” (Fahmy & Johnson, 2005, p. 307) of the conflict, such as reports on refugees,
civilians, or perceptions not favorable to the U.S. military. Although the policy of
embedding did not exist during the Gulf War (Griffin, personal communication, July 15,
2011), analysis offering different accounts of the war did not materialize in the visual
material published of the Gulf War. Less than .5% of the total photographs pictured
civilians in any context (Griffin & Lee, 1995).
Embedding provides access to troops and military commanders, without a formal
censorship apparatus that would release photographs only after they had been viewed and
approved by military censors. However, the embed policy itself functioned as a loose
censorship apparatus restricting what could and could not be reported and punishing
violations by withdrawing permission to embed. The embedding contract restricted
photographing identifiable servicemen/women on all sides of the conflict that had been
killed or wounded, and also restricted photographing landscape and urban markers, that
would identify zones of military preparation. From the military point of view, the embed
policy safeguarded against “disinformation and distortion” (Public Affairs Guidance,
document unclassified, SECDEF MSG, DTG 172200Z JAN 03) and tried to balance
media access with operational security. From a journalistic standpoint, embedding was a
reprieve from the pool system of the Gulf War, but provided challenges to traditional
journalistic values for war reporting. In a conflict zone, journalists are typically required
to be responsive to immediate events as they occur, yet remain safe, to contribute reliable
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and sound information while remaining open to gaps in truth-claims from varying
sources, to be dispassionate about conflicts with more than one side and the strategies
that motivate them while remaining passionate about the erosion of human dignity, and to
be compassionate about human suffering (Allen & Zelizer, 2004). Not only does the
military want to balance access and operational security, but journalists want to balance
their ideal values with access and a minimum of censorship when covering war. When
those interests do not align, a struggle to control what gets pictured ensues. The result of
the struggle between the embed rules and control of the military message with traditional
journalistic values to inform the public converge in the media product that reaches the
public.
If we talk about images as cultural artifacts and readable like a text, or subtext as
Culler (2004) does, we can posit that images have discursive effects just as conventional
texts do because images live in our memory in a way that text does not (Newton, 2001;
Sontag, 2002). Images have added symbolic value when they become iconic
representations and are utilized to culturally define a war (Perlmutter, 1998). Therefore,
not only can images be analyzed by their manifest content and pictorial genre, but also by
the cumulative and priming effects of repeated exposure to the same type of image
(Newton, 2001). Early evaluations of the Gulf War as “nintendo warfare” or “technoimagery” seem to be confirmed by Griffin and Lee’s (1995) study. However, the question
remains whether the Gulf War discourse represents an accurate depiction of the war itself
or simply a symbolic representation of U.S. military power. Cultural attitudes about
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photographs that equate them with knowledge, truth, and evidence (Neuman, Just, &
Crigler, 1992; Sontag, 2002) still pervade the literature despite proof to the contrary, or
whether photographs warrant the assumption of evidence granted them. When Saddam
Hussein’s statue was toppled during the Iraq War, Griffin (2005) found that the
photographs served as a priming motif for news narratives. The news magazines carried
numerous shots of the toppling, which served as “visible symbols of Baathist collapse
and American success” (Griffin, 2005, p. 398). Griffin (2005) argues that in the end it
doesn’t matter that later evidence from Reuters and AFP revealed that these events had
been staged because “the mythic story served by these photos in American newsmagazines and on American television, had already become the accepted symbol of
‘liberation’ and ‘victory’” (p. 398). Major and Perlmutter (2005) argue that news
organizations are expected to contextualize what is being reported and pictured. In this
particular example, the media showed cropped, close up frames of the event. However,
only wide-angled shots would have been able to inform the audience of what was actually
taking place in Firdos Square. This example illustrates the ability of a photograph to be
used both to symbolize and to provide evidence, while lacking the warrant to do either.
In the literature, few comprehensive empirical studies have been completed on
visual materials of the Iraq war to date. Keith, Schwalbe, and Silcock (2010) suggest that
a multimodal content analysis of visual material would involve methodological
difficulties due to the variety of media platforms involved in bringing images to the
public: television, film, print newspapers, magazines, and electronic media. Consumers
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read each mode of presentation in ways particular to the medium, requiring a complex
cross-modality methodology. Thus, single mode media analyses provide the most
effective way of accumulating data on the use of visual materials in media coverage. As
such, a replication of an empirical content analysis of Gulf War imagery extended to the
Iraq War makes a vital contribution to the overall analysis of war as a constructed
discursive media practice and process.
Hypotheses
Griffin and Lee (1995) showed that the discourse surrounding war had changed
markedly from previous wars. It might only indicate that modern warfare itself has
changed—that war is now irrevocably tied to technology. It might reflect the effective
public relations efforts of the Pentagon and The White House, or it might be a reflection
of the level of censorship and the pool system of war coverage. Given the differences in
external circumstances of the Gulf War and the Iraq War—access to troops, degree of
censorship, and length of the wars—four hypotheses can be stated. First, the media have
claimed to have unprecedented access to the theater of war through the policy of
embedding journalists with the troops, which was not the case during the Gulf War. If
media has had unprecedented access to the troops, then a conflict frame should include a
higher frequency of combat photographs as part of the construction of the interpretive
package (Entman, 1993) than the images utilized during the Gulf War. The photographic
coverage should provide a more complex representation of war in general, and how this
particular war was conducted. Therefore the first hypothesis states:
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H1: The inclusion of visual images in coverage of the Iraq War
will feature more photos of combat compared to the amount of
combat depicted during the Gulf War.

Similarly, embedding journalists with the troops should provide proximity to
civilian populations and therefore an opportunity to cover the effects of the war on
civilian populations as stakeholders in the cessation of hostilities. For example, one might
expect more images that address the human cost of war not only to combatants on all
sides, but also civilian populations affected by the hostilities. The restoration of services
disrupted by the war such as basic physical and organizational infrastructures needed for
the peaceful operation of the society should be pictured as well as the cost of war on
civilian populations. Therefore, the second research hypotheses is:
H2

The inclusion of visual images in coverage of the Iraq War will feature more
photos of Iraqi civilians than coverage during the Gulf War.

Likewise, embedding journalists with the troops should provide proximity to the
effects of the war on the environment, whether it is an urban or a rural environment. Such
damage and destruction could include damage to important cultural and social edifices as
well as the destruction of necessary resources for the functioning of the society such as
water and oil. Such a framing would strengthen the journalistic value of objectivity and
frame the war in a way that included more stakeholders. Therefore the third hypothesis is:
H3

The inclusion of visual images in coverage of the Iraq War will feature
more photographic coverage of damage and destruction than coverage
during the Gulf War.
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In contrast to the Gulf War study in which catalog-style armament images were
used to frame the war, embedding with the troops should either provide images of the
results of this increased tendency to use highly technological warfare, instead of the
armaments themselves, or decrease the stand-alone armament imagery featured in the
Gulf War study. Thus, the fourth hypothesis is:
H4

The visual images in coverage of the Iraq War will feature less coverage
of armaments captured in the “cataloging the armaments” category than
coverage during the Gulf War.

The results of this study clarify what effect, if any, embedding journalists with the troops
had on the subject matter of published war photography. The comparison with the results
of Griffin and Lee’s study of the Gulf War clarifies the similarities and differences of war
coverage between these two wars.
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Chapter 3: Method
This study replicates and extends a methodology utilized by Griffin and Lee
(1995) in their visual content analysis of the Gulf War. Quantitative content analysis is
the systematic account and summary of key categories within a particular message set
(Neuendorf, 2002). In this study, the message set is war photography. The strength of
quantitative content analysis lies in its ability to reduce, simplify, and explicate large
amounts of complex media content. It can also track historical changes in modes of
representation using frequency analysis (Bock, Isermann, & Knieper, 2011). Typically
mass media content analyses do not provide details of individual images, but measure
their general manifest content. More detailed visual content analyses point to specific
aspects of a media representation, such as how women or cultural minorities are depicted
through clothing or body positioning in communicating texts. Griffin and Lee (1995)
used a content analysis to gather data regarding the inclusion or omission of manifest
content associated with war generally and the Gulf War specifically. For instance instead
of coding for how the president was pictured, behind a podium, a portrait, or at work,
Griffin and Lee (1995) simply coded for the presence of a picture of the President
regardless of his positioning in relation to other elements within the photograph. In this
study, I replicated and ultimately extended their categorization style to analyze
representations of the Iraq War.
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Conceptualization
Griffin and Lee’s (1995) categorization criteria were based upon a survey of war
coverage from three previous wars: World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam
War. They employed coding categories distilled using a constant comparative method to
include manifest photographic content published during those wars (Griffin & Lee, 1995,
pp. 814-15). Manifest content in a quantitative content analysis is considered content that
is visible and quantifiable in the photograph (Neuendorf, 2002). For example, a
photograph of a person within the context of the war such as George W. Bush or Saddam
Hussein would be coded as present in a political category, while U.S. or Iraq generals
would be coded in a military category based on Griffin and Lee’s categorization scheme.
Griffin and Lee (1995) defined their unit of measurement as a single photograph
or image. Each visual document was supported with reference to the texts accompanying
the image as headers or captions. Griffin and Lee (1995) found that an overwhelming
majority of the images had a clear focus of content, so that coding for multiple genre
categories in one image, and therefore weighting content, was not necessary (Griffin,
personal communication, July 15, 2011). The content of the image was considered to be
the overriding manifest theme or focal point of the image. As one of the original scholars
noted, “. . . we found that the overwhelming majority of pictures had a ‘clear main focus
of content’ so that this procedure [coding for prominent manifest content] did not prove
problematic” (Griffin, personal communication, July 15, 2011). Additionally, structural
aspects of images such as color versus black and white photography and the size of the
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image were tracked for each image. Images were also coded for the degree to which they
were contemporaneous with current events, as opposed to those that were posed or
staged. Posed photographs usually occurred with portraits of individuals such as the
president or major political actors in the Gulf War. These photographs were relatively
easy to spot by references to the source of the photo, such as the White House
photographer in the case of political actors, or portrait photography taken by a
professional photographer before a soldier deployed and used to represent soldiers who
had died in combat. In the context of war, staged photographs were considered to be
those that captured a sense of a battle through photographs of its reenactment.
Historically these photos were accompanied by text indicating that the scene is staged for
clarification purposes. There were also some photographs that were originally published
and have since been revealed as “fakes” that were originally intended to deceive or give a
false impression. One such example is the toppling of a statue of Saddam Hussein in
Baghdad’s Firdos Square (Fahmy, 2007). The presence of an archival photo was usually
indicated in the caption, was obviously taken during a previous war, or was the result of
lack of access to the pictured individual, such as Saddam Hussein or Osama bin Laden
and was therefore pulled from archival photographs or a screen shot from television.
A photograph or image was eligible for inclusion in this study if it accompanied
any article covering the Iraq War from January 1, 2003 through December 31, 2011.
These dates were selected to include images used to frame the necessity of the war before
the war began, the onset of hostilities, and the proposed end of hostilities and pullout of
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troops in December 2011. There were no exclusions to this rule unless a photograph was
duplicated in a cover or title page and then reproduced again within the article itself. If
there were duplications, preference was given to the photograph included in the article,
which was usually the larger photograph. A protocol for counting the images when
multiple images appeared on the same page was to number them in order from top left to
right and from top to bottom of the page. If a photograph spanned the fold in the middle
of two pages (which happened often), the page number assigned to that photograph was
the left-hand page.
I based my coding categories on the original codes identified by Griffin and Lee
(1995) in their content analysis of the Gulf War. Their findings during a pilot coding
session found that some categories were not useful in detecting prominent content, or that
very few pictures related to those categories. Therefore, in their final analysis they
collapsed the number of categories, and combined a number of very low count categories
into “other.” They did retain those low count categories that they thought might be
measures of important absences in the pictorial coverage (Griffin, personal
communication, July 15, 2011). I base my categories on Griffin and Lee’s (1995) original
codes allowing the full spectrum of possible coding choices.
Weighting of content was only accounted for through the size of the image, with a
cover or two-page spread counting more than a full-page image (or a front cover)
counting more than a half page image, which counted more than a quarter page image,
and so forth. In visual communication studies, it has been found that the larger the image
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size, the more salience is accorded to the visual content (Bock et al., 2011). Likewise,
positioning an image on the front cover of the magazine accords that image relevant
status as a defining image of the war. Coding for color or black and white images can
inform us about the types of image shown in black and white, perhaps a particularly
grisly or archival photograph.
Coding Scheme, Codebook, and Coding Sheet
The coding scheme included five general categories under which multiple details
were possible. The most general category was the genre category, which captured the
focal interest of the photograph. Each possible genre had four options which allowed
coding for four participating combatants of the Iraq War: the U.S., Allies of the U.S.,
Iraq, or Other, which might include images associated with non-Allied nations or the
U.N. The general genre categories included: political, military, civilian life, damage and
destruction, and the emergent category of terrorism.
The genre categories were followed by detail categories that included: people,
types of warfare such as combat or behind the lines representations, casualties, and types
of damage and destruction. The category of people included political leaders, military
leaders, soldiers/troops, POWs, civilians, protesters, and women and children.
Armaments, which Griffin and Lee (1995) called “cataloging the arsenal” (p. 816), were
divided into separate categories for each type of armament such as jets, helicopters, tanks
or Humvees, naval vessels, missiles, and drones. One of the major findings of Griffin and
Lee’s 1995 study was the prevalence “cataloging the arsenal” images which constituted
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23% of the total published. Each type of armament was originally listed separately and
only later collapsed into one category called “cataloging the arsenal.” Following Griffin
and Lee’s categorization, my original categorization design maintained their initial
category distinctions in order to document the prevalence of certain types of weaponry.
Casualties were also coded to specify wounded or dead individuals who were
political, military, or civilian in nature across the four sub-categories of war combatants.
Included in this category were representations of death—pictures in which coffins or
portraits of fallen soldiers or civilians represented the dead individual. The genre of
damage and destruction had detail categories that included general damage to
infrastructure—buildings, governmental agencies, housing, mosques, and roads. Other
kinds of damage such as sabotage to oil fields or reserves and/or environmental damage
such as contamination of water or the destruction of agriculture or animals were also
coded for as subcategories of the general genre of damage and destruction.
The codes in the codebook accounted for demographic information about each
photograph, which were identified by an identifying number, the name of the publication
in which it was published, the volume and issue number, the date of publication, the
name of the photographer, the source of the photo (e.g., from the government/military or
news agency), whether the photo was black and white or color, the size of the image, and
the heading, subhead, and caption accompanying the article and image. The above
information is considered the “media context” in visual content analysis and was
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documented by the primary investigator on each individual coding sheet before the
coders came into contact with the images.
Each broad coding category, or genre, included smaller subcategories that gave
more detail. A photograph was coded for its genre as well as the dominant detail category
as the focal point of the photograph. If the photograph or image mode was archival,
grisly, posed, or staged, that information was also coded. Most of the possible categories
were not abstract concepts that required complex judgments by the coders. They simply
required a judgment as to the presence of the category within the manifest content of the
image. Most of the categories were nominally coded for the most prominent subject or
content of the image, by which prominence was measured by the centrality of the main
subject matter within the image, or identification by a reference in the caption.
The coding form provided to the coders was a two-sided single sheet of 8-1/2” x
11” paper with the possible codes for each image. The full codebook is included in
Appendix A, and an example of the coding form after the emergent codes were included
is shown in Appendix B.
Data Collection and Sampling
I obtained images related to the Iraq War by accessing the physical copies of the
three weekly news publications that were utilized by Griffin and Lee (1995). Time
Magazine, Newsweek Magazine, and U.S. News and World Report supply weekly
compilations of coverage of the Iraq War that “compress, recapitulate, elaborate upon and
critique television and newspaper reports of the previous week” (Griffin & Lee, 1995, p.
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814). At the same time, these newsmagazines had large readerships and subscription
bases as well as an online presence with additional visual material available through a
website listed at the bottom of the page of an article. As of August 2010, the three top
newsmagazines in the U.S. were Time Magazine with a circulation of 3,312,484;
Newsweek Magazine with a circulation of 1,610,632; and U.S. News and World Report
with a circulation of 1,129,618. All circulation figures are as reported by the Audit
Bureau of Circulation (Huff Post Media, 2011). In addition to circulation numbers,
newsmagazines offer the advantage of a “populations of images” (Griffin, 1995, p. 814)
to analyze on a weekly basis establishing an historical paradigm of meaning for
individual wars.
Portland State University library had physical copies of each periodical for the
years in question except 2010 and 2011, which were available at the Multnomah County
Library in Portland, Oregon. I documented each photograph that was included in an
article about the Iraq War by making a list and numbering each photograph in the order
dictated by the numbering protocol, noting the date of publication, and the page number
on which the photograph appeared. Because each magazine is published at the end of
each week and on the same day, the publication dates for all three news magazines
coincided with each other. I decided to use a stratified sampling method because such a
sampling “recognizes distinct subpopulations (strata) within a population” (Krippendorff,
2004, p. 115). Each sampling unit belongs to only one stratum, such as the decreasing
population of images per year of war coverage, so that sampling for each stratum can be
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conducted separately and can be sampled in their proportion to the census population of
images (Krippendorff, 2004). Listing the census of images, which would later determine
the stratified sample, was done in repetitive order of Time, then Newsweek, and then U.S.
News and World Report so that the images in each of the three news magazines would
reflect the same range of dates. The only time this order changed was in 2008 and 2009,
when U.S. News and World Report reduced its frequency of publication to twice monthly.
The subsequent bimonthly issues of U.S. News and World Report covered 2 weeks of
news on Iraq. The original design to number the photographs with the date of publication
was maintained through 2008 and 2009.
A stratified sampling method is also sensitive to changes in coverage due to major
political and military events or shifts in policy. A sample that is sensitive to the war’s
trajectory from 2003-2009, including major political and military events, is important to
an analysis of war images due to a viewer’s ability to withdraw images from any
contextual and representational anchoring (Anderson, 1989). Likewise, tracking not just
the overall frequencies of manifest content, but also connecting image content
frequencies to an historical timeline provided patterns of usage and omission not
provided by simple overall frequencies. Included in the sample were images and
photographs on the magazine covers as well as the smaller photographs in the content
section of the newsmagazine, provided they were not duplicates of images reproduced in
the article itself. Further, the decision was made to physically go through each magazine
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after an online search using Communication and Mass Media Complete and the search
criteria “Iraq” occasionally yielded articles on Iran.
The photographs and images related to the Iraq War from January 1, 2001 through
December 31, 2009 generated a population of N = 4,754 images. In order to generate a
sample size that would give me a 95% confidence level that a random selection of images
would reflect the content of the full population of images with only a 5% margin of error,
I used Creative Research System’s online sample size calculator. With a census size of
N = 4,754 as the population of images, the calculator generated a suggested sample size
of n = 356 images. I then used the percentage of photographs per year to generate a
random sample for each year of publication using Urbaniak and Pious’ (2008) Research
Randomizer. Of those images, 1,950 photographs were published about the war in 2003,
constituting 41% of the total population of images; 843 photographs were published in
2004 constituting 17.7% of the total; 622 photographs were published in 2005
constituting 13% of the total; 556 photographs were published in 2006 constituting 12%
of the total; 557 were published in 2007 constituting 11.7% of the total; 144 photographs
were published in 2008 constituting 3% of the total; and 78 photographs were published
in 2009 constituting 1.6% of the total. These percentages indicated that I needed 146
images from 2003, 63 images from 2004, 46 images from 2005, 42 images from 2006,
another 42 images from 2007, 11 images from 2008, and 6 images from 2009. These
amounts were then used to generate random samples in each year of publication using the
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sequential numbering system I had established when documenting the full population of
images.
The numbers generated referred to the number of the photograph to be included in
the sample as listed in the complete population of images. I then went to the Portland
State University library and looked up each photograph according to the list, which
included the publication name, date of publication, issue number, and page number.
Using both my iPhone and iPad, I photographed each image that the randomizer had
selected in order to digitize the image for the coders to code.
My study includes both photographs and images, such as infographics and maps,
from the preparation of troops before the onset of the war, including the dates January 1,
2003 to the commencement of hostilities on March 20, 2003, and continuing until
December 21, 2009. The images published a few months before the Allied invasion of
Iraq are considered crucial to how the war was visually framed. Additionally, my intent
was to include coverage of the Iraq War until December 2011, when it was announced by
President Barack Obama that U.S. troops were returning to the United States. A search
for the missing information in 2010 and 2011 revealed that there were approximately 109
additional photographs covering the war during that time period. As a percentage of the
full census, this would have included only an additional 8 images, 4 in each year. The
Portland State University library had stopped carrying hard copies of the three
newsmagazines and other regional university libraries only had the data on microfiche,
which would only provide me with a negative photographic image. The one source that

War’s Visual Discourse: A Content Analysis of Iraq War Imagery

45

did carry the physical copies of the magazines, Multnomah County Library, had had the
copies concerning the Iraq War stolen. Therefore, out of necessity, the break off date of
the study was December 2009.
Coder Training and Protocols
Two coders volunteered to code the randomly selected sample of n = 110 images.
One coder was a former graduate from Portland State University’s Department of
Communication with an M.S. in Communication Studies, and the other is an established
artist and former graphic designer with The Oregonian newspaper in Portland, Oregon.
The coding protocol and codebook gave the coders specific parameters for the
operationalization of each category (Appendix A), as well as an overview of the whole
project. Thirty-five photographs not included in the codebook examples or in the final
thesis sample were selected from the full census for an intercoder reliability pilot test.
Intercoder reliability from the first pilot test generated 78% simple percent agreement
across categories. With such a low percent of agreement, further coder training was
necessary and I conducted a 4-hour training session with the coders. We reviewed the
codebook parameters and systematically went through the previous coding attempt and
discussed how the first test sample was coded, refining everyone’s understanding of the
coding and category definitions, as well as adopting additional codes that clarified and
distinguished one category from another. For instance, it became clear that it was difficult
to know whether to code pictured veterans as military or civilian. A coding rule was
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agreed upon to create a category for veterans to alleviate this uncertainty and account for
the amount of coverage veterans received in the media.
After the second training session, a further test of intercoder reliability was
conducted by coding another sample randomly selected from the full population of
images. The intercoder reliability on this second test sample generated a 94% simple
percentage agreement and the decision was made to start the final coding of the sample
photographs. Reliability coefficients of .90 or greater are acceptable to all, and .80 or
greater are acceptable to report. Cohen’s Kappa, the method used to calculate the final
intercoder reliability in this study, allows more liberal parameters (Neuendorf, 2002, p.
143). During the pilot coding process, coders were instructed to place any manifest
content that did not fit the established codes into an “emergent” category and to jot down
suggestions for how they would code those photographs. The use of emergent categories
to capture content not anticipated, particularly in a content analysis duplicating and
extending the methodology of previous research, is a necessity. These emergent category
codes were discussed during the second pilot training session and 11 emergent codes
were agreed upon and added to a revised codebook and addendum to the coding sheet.
The final intercoder reliability coding sample of 110 new images was subsequently coded
using the additional emergent categories.
Griffin and Lee (1995) decided to combine some categories during their coding
process because maintaining separate categories did not reveal significant information.
This process was also justifiable in the current content analysis. Thus, 24 categories were
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collapsed into 5 categories. The category “Cataloging the Arsenal” originally
distinguished between different types of armaments for four participating combatants, the
U.S., Allied troops, Iraq, and Other. This did not prove to be productive for the study,
because the images associated with armaments included many different armaments
within one, usually illustrated, infographic. An infographic was counted as one instance
of the category instead of counting each illustration of a weapon within the infographic as
an instance. This compression of the category still allowed for subsequent individual
images of weapons to be counted for each participating combatant provided it was a
stand-alone photograph or graphic image. Drones were maintained as a separate category
due to the prominence they have received in the press related to ethical, policy, and
budget considerations. This is justified by the increased use of drones as a war
technology and particularly in as much as the 2013 defense budget proposed an increase
in the budget for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) or drones (McGreal, 2012).
The coders were given access to the full sample of images they were to code
when I placed the randomly selected coding sample of 110 images into Dropbox, an
online sharing platform for documents and images. The random sample of 110 images
amounted to 30% of the full sample of n = 356 images coded for the study. A sample of
20% would suffice to guarantee reliability and generalizability to a larger population,
however, 30% seemed a more appropriate size for this study in order to capture
photographs that included the large set of variables.
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Emergent Categories
During the two coding pilot tests, 11 additional coding categories were agreed
upon and added to both the codebook and the coding sheet. The emergent categories
captured content that was either not present in the coverage of previous wars, or were
created to clarify existing categories. One category was created to differentiate between
photographs of combat in which actual fighting was pictured, and combat patrol.
Patrolling is a form of combat because of the diffuse nature of conflict in modern warfare
tending more to smaller patrols, skirmishes, and sniping rather than battle lines and
troops facing each other. The anxiety associated with constant vigilance necessary during
a patrol justifies coding “patrolling” as a form of combat, but also its differentiation from
battles in which direct combat is pictured. The new category, “C-patrol,” was included
with four dimensions for U.S., Allies, Iraq, and Other combatants.
The original decision to omit “terrorism” as a category was made during the
process of documenting the census data. Issues of terrorism were almost exclusively tied
in coverage to the war in Afghanistan or to the events of September 11, 2001. However,
terrorists and terrorism were tied to Iraq in a few articles justifying additional emergent
codes. Consequently, “Terrorism–Iraq” and “Terrorism–Other” were added to the genre
category and “Terrorist–Iraq” and “Terrorist–Other” were added as a subcategory of
“people.” The categories “Terrorism–Other,” and “Terrorist–Other” typically depicted
terrorists from other countries operating in Iraq and considered to be influencing the
fighting. Categories to account for wounded and dead terrorists were also created as
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“Terrorist–Wounded,” and “Terrorist–Dead.” Likewise, coding Iraqi civilians as
terrorists because of their use of terrorist tactics like suicide bombings was decided
against in favor of categorizing them as “Civilian Insurgents.” This category only
appeared during the coding process after the beginning of sectarian violence between
Shi’ite and Sunni Muslim factions. A differentiation between Shi’ite insurgents and
Sunni insurgents was not made. In a similar vein, two additional codes, “Military
Misconduct–U.S.” and “Military Misconduct–Iraq,” emerged when photographs
associated with the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse, and the beheading of the American
journalist, Nicholas Berg could not be accounted for with the original codes. The code
“Political Misconduct–U.S.” emerged to account for photographs and images related to
the outing of Valerie Plame as a CIA operative, and the congressional hearings and grand
jury testimony of highly placed U.S. political insiders. The subsequent indictment of
Scooter Libby for his part in the disclosure of classified information and the connection
to the suppression of evidence that there were no weapons of mass destruction as claimed
by the administration was also included in the articles related to the war in Iraq.
When coders questioned whether to code U.S. veterans as military or civilian, the
photos were examined and instances of either coding decision could be justified. The
decision was made to clarify those decisions with the category of “Veteran–U.S.” under
the larger military genre category. Similarly, categories of “political dead” and “political
wounded” were added after a symbolic photo representing the assassination of an Iraqi
politician was part of the sample and could not be meaningfully coded as military or

War’s Visual Discourse: A Content Analysis of Iraq War Imagery

50

civilian dead. The new codes were created to resemble the predetermined codes
accounting for all four combatant categories involved in the war.
Intercoder Reliability
Two coders and myself coded the sample of n = 110 photographs and images after
which each code sheet, for all three coders, was entered into an SPSS spreadsheet with
the number “1” indicating the presence of a category and the number “0” indicating the
absence of the category. There were no missing values. Each individual category was
entered into an Excel spreadsheet with the coders on the x-axis and each case on the yaxis. These data were copied and pasted into the online reliability calculator, ReCal3,
developed by Deen Freelon (2012). ReCal3 calculates Cohen’s Kappa, κ = [(Ao - Pc) / (1Pc] “where Ao is a proportion of units with matching categories (% agreement), and Pc is
the agreement that can be expected when the two observers’ proclivity to use their
categories differently is assumed and taken for granted” (Krippendorff, 2008, p. 246).
ReCal3 can calculate Cohen’s Kappa between three coders, establishing averaged
intercoder reliability for each category as well as pairwise agreement between coders. To
calculate overall agreement for all categories, I added the agreement for each code and
averaged them for a final intercoder reliability of 86%. There were 64 categories that
were not included in calculating Cohen’s Kappa because they were designated
“undefined” by ReCal3. These categories reached 100% simple percent agreement
because the categories were not represented in the coding sample and zeros indicating
“absent” were recorded on the code sheets. Expected disagreement on such categories
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cannot be calculated according to Krippendorff (2008) and were therefore omitted from
the intercoder reliability calculation.
The categories included in calculating intercoder reliability consisted of 61
categories and yielded an intercoder reliability of 0.856, with maximum agreement
reached in the “Military–Allied,” “Behind the lines–Allied” and “Destruction–Other”
categories all with 1.0 agreement. The lowest percent agreement occurred in the category
of “Political–Allied” probably due to coder uncertainty regarding the status of the U.N. as
a neutral party versus an ally of the United States. Systematic divergent coding was
evident in the category of “Grisly–U.S.” with an overall reliability coefficient of .66. The
“grisly” category, as an abstract concept, was used to capture photographs in which
soldiers or civilians were shown distressed, wounded, or near death. Any visible evidence
of blood also implied a categorization as grisly. However, there were systematic
differences between the coders regarding what constituted a grisly photograph,
suggesting that the coders coded for latent content instead of manifest content. For
example, a photograph of Iraqi women prisoners as shown in Figure 3 was coded by
coder #2 and coder #3 as grisly, an obvious coding of latent content because the caption
indicated that at least one of these women was scheduled to be executed. However, the
manifest content of the photograph is not grisly and requires interpretation to be coded
thus.
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Figure 3. Yuri Kozyrev (photographer), in Time 168(21), 11.20.06, p. 45.
Overall, pairwise intercoder reliability in the genre category showed 0.78 agreement
between coder #1 and coder #3; 0.82 agreement between coders #1 and #2; and 0.72
agreement between coders #2 and #3.
The category of media context or mode of an image—whether it was pulled from
an archive, was posed by the photographer or event organizer, or was an infographic
explaining the political or military terrain—had a low level of intercoder agreement. The
overall agreement for the “Mode” category was 0.67, with pairwise agreement between
coder #1 and coder #3 at 0.60; between coder #1 and #2 at 0.71; and between coder #2
and #3 at .72. Indications of archival images were usually aided by the caption; however,
disagreements were usually due to omission, rather than disagreements about the mode.
The category of “People” as a detail category generated a total agreement of 0.87,
with the highest percent agreement occurring in the categories “Political Leader–U.S.,”
“Military Leader–U.S.,” “Soldiers/Troops–Allied,” and “Soldiers/Troops–Other,”
“Veterans–U.S.,” “Protesters–Iraq,” and “Protesters–Other.” These seven categories
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generated 100% agreement. These all tended to be categories in which the caption
identified the individuals within the photograph. Pairwise agreement for the overall
category resulted in coder #1 and #3 reaching 0.86 agreement, coder #1 and #2 with .92
agreement, and coder #2 and #3 with 0.82 agreement. The detail codes with the lowest
percent agreement were “Civilians–U.S.,” and “Political leader–Other.” This could be
due to failure to code for U.S. civilians if it was felt they were not the focus of the
photograph, or in the case of other political leaders, simply not knowing the status of a
pictured political leader.
The categories that had the highest percentage of agreement were “Cataloging the
Arsenal–U.S.,” with an overall agreement of .95, and “Damage and Destruction–U.S.,”
“Damage and Destruction–Iraq,” and “Damage and Destruction–Other” all with 100%
agreement. The mode through which “Cataloging the Arsenal” was represented was
almost exclusively in the style of infographics. Each infographic was considered one
instance of the category despite having multiple images of armaments within the borders
of the infographic as seen in Figure 4.

Figure 4. Ed Gabel (illustrator), in Time 161(13), 3.31.03, p. 51.

War’s Visual Discourse: A Content Analysis of Iraq War Imagery

54

The “casualty” category had high agreement in some detail categories and low
agreement in others. High agreement was reached in “Political Dead–Iraq,” with 1.0
agreement, “Military Dead–U.S.,” with .94 agreement, “Military Dead–Iraq” with 1.0
agreement, and “Civilian wounded–Iraq” with .90 agreement. The lowest agreement was
with the categories “Civilian Wounded–Other,” and “Coffins–Iraq,” both with an overall
intercoder reliability of .333. For a full comparison and individual tabulations of overall
and pairwise intercoder reliabilities see Table 3 in the Appendices.
The emergent category “Military Misconduct–U.S.” also had a high level of
intercoder reliability with an overall coefficient of .94. Pairwise agreement between coder
#1 and #3 was .91, between #1 and #2 was 1.0, and between #2 and #3 was .91. Many of
these images were also included in the “Grisly–Iraq” category, which also generated high
overall agreement of .94.
A post hoc review of the categorization scheme of Griffin and Lee’s (1995) Gulf
War study in which I applied my coding scheme to the census of images used, revealed
virtually identical coding with one exception, primarily in the “cataloging the
armaments” category. The results of this parallel coding are discussed in the results
section.
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Chapter 4: Results
According to the literature on visual methodologies, “there is no stable point that
can provide an entrance into the meaning-making process; all meanings are relational not
only within the image, but also in relation to other images and to broader dominant codes,
referent systems and mythologies” (Rose, 2006, p. 91). The predominance of one code
over another could be said to have “weight” in that its preponderance will act as a cue to
cognitive relevance. In this sense categories with high frequencies will become more
relevant to the meaning-making functions of news images for a particular war.
Statistics
The coded data were entered into Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS),
a software program that manages large sets of data and facilitates the emergence of
patterns through text analytics and statistical analysis. The coded visual content was
calculated using simple statistical frequency counts and proportions to see if the
hypotheses about changes in the visual categories in Iraq War images were supported by
the data and differentiated from the data that predominated in Griffin and Lee’s (1995)
study of the Gulf War. Typically the relationship between sets of numerical data and their
significance cannot be determined simply by counting, therefore percentages and
proportions of the sample were added to give more meaning to the numbers. A proportion
“reflects the degree to which a particular category dominates the whole” (Riffe, Lacey, &
Fico, 2005, p. 179). The results of the frequency counts have also been compared to those
of the Gulf War to see if the changes, if any, are statistically significant in that the
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probability of getting the quantifiable categorization result reflects a pattern beyond
chance, or are simply substantively significant, in that the real world effects the results
have on the meaning of the findings are considered substantive.
High Frequency Categories
Six categories captured 90% of the images. The largest category of photographs
and images were of the “Soldiers/Troops–U.S.” and constituted 30% of the sample
images with 108 images. This individual category was part of the larger inclusive military
category, which captured another 10% of the images including military leaders, the U.S.
arsenal, military misconduct, veterans, and military infographics for an overall genre
category capturing 40% of the image share. Naturally one expects images of combat,
troops, military leaders, and weaponry and technology to dominate war imagery.
However, the prevalence of images of U.S. military troops to the exclusion of Allied
troops, or any Allied involvement is reflected in the low or nonexistent percentages of
photographs showing Allied troops or politicians. Particularly America’s closest ally,
Britain, is noticeably absent in any representations, with only one photograph of Tony
Blair in the political category, one of British troops on patrol, and the balance of Allied
images consisting of the Peshmerga, a Kurdish allied militia. The second most frequent
category was “Civilian Life–Iraq” with 55 images constituting 15% of the sample
images. The third most frequent category was “Political–U.S.” with 48 images
constituting 13.4% of the sample images. The top three categories accounted for 68% of
the sample images. The next two most frequent categories, the category “Political–Iraq”
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(10.7%), and “Military–Iraq” (7%) raise the overall percentage to 86% with a count of 38
images and 24 images respectively. The sixth most frequent category, “Damage &
Destruction–Iraq” accounted for 3.65% of the sample with 13 images.
Table 1
High Frequency Categories in Iraq War Pictures
Category

Subcategory

Photos

% of total

Military–U.S.
Troops

Soldiers/Troops
Behind-lines (25)
Combat (10)
C-patrol (35)
Wounded (13)
Dead (15)
General (10)
Military leaders (5)
Armaments (13)
Misconduct (14)
Veterans (2)
Infographics (1)
Civilians
Women/Children (25)
Civilian Men (16)
Civilian wounded (7)
Civilian dead (7)
Political leaders (33)
Protesters (4)
Political dead (1)
Guantanamo (6)
Infographics (4)
Political leaders (19)
Protesters (2)
Political misconduct (2)
Political civilians (10)
Infographics (5)

108

30%

35

10%

55

15%

48

13%

38

11%

Military–U.S.

Civilian Life–Iraq

Political–U.S.

Political–Iraq
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Table 1
High Frequency Categories in Iraq War Pictures
Category

Subcategory

Photos

% of total

Military–Iraq

Military leaders (1)
24
7%
Arsenal (2)
Troops (1)
Insurgents (11)
Military misconduct (3)
Destruction–Iraq
Infrastructure (12)
13
4%
Oil & Energy (1)
______________________________________________________________________________________
Totals
321
90%1

Four hypotheses were proposed for this research. As a response to Griffin and
Lee’s (1995) Gulf War study and the replacement of combat images with a predominance
of images devoted to armaments (23%), it was hypothesized that journalists embedding
with the troops would reverse this photographic trend. The first hypothesis, H1, predicted
that the amount of images of troops in combat would increase compared to the amount
pictured during the Gulf War. The second hypothesis, H2, hypothesized that more Iraqi
civilians would be pictured in coverage of the Iraq War due to the urban nature of the war
and access to civilians through the embed policy. The third hypothesis, H3, hypothesized
that coverage would feature more images of overall damage and destruction than
previous coverage during the Gulf War. And the fourth hypothesis, H4, hypothesized that
coverage concentrating on “cataloging the armaments” would decrease as a result of
having more immediate access to troops.

1

Percentages have been rounded up to a full percentage point if the decimal place was above .5, and
rounded down to a full percentage point if the decimal place was below .5.
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As hypothesized in H1, the incidence of combat photography increased during
the Iraq War and accounted for 13% of the photographs in the sample. It is, however,
important to distinguish between traditional combat photography in which combat action
(3%) was pictured, and the category of C-patrol (10%), which was an emergent combat
category. These images pictured troops within an urban environment and showed troops
performing specific tactical tasks such as gathering information, reconnaissance,
surveillance, and providing security. Such images do not impart the action, danger, and/or
anguish that are typically considered to comprise combat photography. Patrolling
nevertheless requires a type of vigilance consistent with combat and not required by
troops behind the lines. Comparing traditional combat photography with the Gulf War
study, which aggregated combat images for all nations, the percentage of combat images
to the total remained at approximately 3%, with the qualitative difference being that the
traditional combat photography in this Iraq War study only pictured U.S. troops and not
allied or enemy troops. Also in the post hoc review of the Gulf War images, photographs
that could have been coded as “C-patrol,” were not included in the population of
photographs Griffin and Lee (1995) coded. This is likely due to the nature of the war
itself, which was to expel Iraq’s military from Kuwait and not nation building which
required a continued presence in Iraq. Chi Square calculated between categories related
to images representing traditional U.S. combat, and patrol, as well as images related to
the Iraq military categories in the Iraq War data with, n = 356, df = 1, showed no
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statistical significance, n.s. (Table 4). Therefore, the first hypothesis was not supported
by the data.
The second hypothesis, H2, proposed that more images of Iraqi civilians would
be published during the Iraq War. Indeed, images of Iraqi civilians constituted 15% of the
sample, a dramatic increase from the 1% pictured during the Gulf War and the second
largest category of images included in the study. An Iraqi civilian was typically
pictorially differentiated by dress, gender, and age. Categorization decisions were also
assisted by captions identifying whether the person pictured was a civilian, a militiaman,
or an insurgent. Chi Square calculated between categories related to images representing
the Iraq military and images related to picturing civilians in the Iraq War data with, n =
356, df = 1, showed statistical significance in one category — “Iraqi insurgents” and
“Iraqi civilians” — with .041 p value (Table 4). This single statistically significant value
however, does not support the second hypothesis.
The third hypothesis, H3, proposed that images of damage and destruction would
increase in frequency compared to Griffin and Lee’s (1995) Gulf War study. This study
showed an overall frequency of 5.62% of the sample picturing damage and destruction to
all parties engaged in the war, compared to the 3% pictured during the Gulf War.
However, the percentage of damage and destruction to Iraq alone was 3.65%, compared
to the 3% in Griffin and Lee’s (1995, p. 817) study. Most of the images of damage and
destruction in this Iraq War study were long-distance shots of Baghdad as pictured in
Figure 5, or close up shots as the result of a specific incident as shown in Figure 6.
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Figure 5. Yuri Kozyrev (photographer),
in Time 161(15), 4.14.03, pp. 52-53.
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Figure 6. Wathig Khusaie
(photographer), Getty Images, in
Newsweek 144(13), 9.27.04, pp. 32-33.

There was damage and destruction in many photographs, but the focal point of the
image was usually not the damage and destruction, rather other elements of the
photograph and were therefore coded to other categories. The damage and destruction to
Iraq alone accounted for 3.65% of the sample, with 13 photographs, and included one
photo, that documented damage to the oil industry through oil smuggling. This may be an
artifact of the sample, but the scarcity of oil-related images is curious given the essential
nature of oil exports to Iraq’s economy. The other 1.8% of the photos in the damage and
destruction categories pictured damage to U.S. materiel, and damage due to the bombing
of the U.N. headquarters in August, 2003, categorized as “Destruction–Other.” Chi
Square calculated between categories related to “U.S. Damage and Destruction”, “Other
Damage and Destruction,” “Iraq Damage and Destruction,” and “Oil” in the Iraq War
data with, n = 356, df = 1, showed no statistical significance, n.s. in any content
categories (Table 4). Therefore, the third hypothesis was not supported by the data.
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The total number of images in the sample slightly favored both Time (36.5%) and
Newsweek (38.2%) with U.S. News and World Report (25.3%) accounting for 10%+ less
of the images selected during the random sampling. U.S. News and World Report reduced
publication frequency in 2008, which alone did not contribute to the overall smaller
percentage of contribution. U.S. News and World Report covered 2 weeks of events
within one issue, the consequence of which was reduced publication space available to
illustrate events on the ground, and thus fewer photographs. Despite this reduction of
contribution, the top three categories: “Military–U.S.,” “Civilian Life–Iraq,” and
“Political–U.S.,” accounted for 68% of the images and were the top three categories
across all three magazines.
Dominant Categories
Within the most prevalent genre of “Military–U.S.,” the category “C-patrol–U.S.”
generated the most photographs with 35 photos and 10% of the total sample, this
combined with the category “Combat–U.S.” and 10 photos (3%) constituted 32% of the
U.S. military genre, and 13% of the overall sample. Typical combat photographs are
shown in Figures 7 and 8.
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Figure 7. Robert Nickelsberg
(photographer), Getty Images, in Time
162(25), 12.22.03, pp. 80-81
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Figure 8. James Nachtwey
(photographer), VII, in Time
162(26), 12.29.03, pp.45-45.

Photographs coded as “C-patrol” pictured U.S. troops patrolling the streets, guarding
POWs, house-to-house searches, and interfacing with civilians while on patrol (Figures 9
and 10).

Figure 9. Photographer unknown,
U.S. News and World Report 135(4),
8.11.03, p. 18.

Figure 10. Gary Knight
(photographer), in Newsweek
143(1), 1.5.04, pp. 34-35.

In the post hoc review of the photographs coded for the Gulf War study, the “Cpatrol – U.S.” category was not represented in the census of photographs coded by
Griffin and Lee (1995). This result is likely due to the nature of the conflict and not a
reflection of differing coding protocols. Patrolling and reconnaissance was simply
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integral to a strategy requiring a continued presence in Iraq’s urban settings. Because of
this, statistical significance cannot be calculated. However, substantive significance
suggests that inclusion of this emergent category has meaning for the overall differences
in category dominance during the Iraq War.
Images of U.S. troops behind the lines constituted 18% of the military genre with
25 photos. Behind the lines images usually pictured troops training in Kuwait for combat
in Iraq, training Iraqi militias to take over combat duties from coalition forces, practicing,
and Peshmerga guards in Kurdistan, a northern region of Iraq. They also portrayed
training at West Point for the next generation of U.S. officers. Some of the behind the
lines images were visually indistinguishable from real combat photos and therefore, as
Hallin (1986) and Sontag (1973, 2003) suggest, were dependent on captions to tell the
coders what they were seeing.
The “Troops–U.S.” category dominated the U.S. military genre with a larger
percentage of inclusion than “Military Leaders–U.S.” There were only 5 images of
military leaders included in the sample, a low frequency category of 1.4%. Images of
U.S. military leaders replaced images of political leaders in 2003 and were primarily of
U.S. generals that had taken over control of the U.S. troops throughout the conflict.
Images of their counterparts in the Iraqi Army were practically nonexistent, with one
image of Saddam Hussein posing with military leaders in February 2003, before the
hostilities began. No further images of Iraqi military leaders were included in the sample,
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which might be due to issues of access, but more likely is due to the contested U.S.
administration’s order to disband the Iraqi Army in 2003 (Kaplan, 2007).
The casualty category “Military Wounded–U.S.” garnered 13 images (4%) and
“Military Dead–U.S.” with 15 images (4%), had a combined percentage of 8% of the
total sample. While the images of the military wounded did occasionally show the results
of their wounds, including bloody and mangled body parts, the military dead were
exclusively represented by photographs taken before the soldiers were deployed to Iraq,
and were largely posed portraits in uniform. Occasionally a memorial tableaux arranged
in a parent’s or loved one’s home, or typical military symbolism of a helmet on the
soldier’s rifle were used to represent dead troops. There were four pictures of flag-draped
coffins included in the representations of dead U.S. troops, one of which received a
journalistic award (Figure 11).

Figure 11. Todd Heisler (photographer), Rocky Mountain News in Time 166(21),
11.21.05, pp. 42-43.
The category “Cataloging the Arsenal” that predominated coverage in Griffin and
Lee’s (1995) Gulf War study with 23% of the total coverage and 249 images, constituted
only 4% of the overall total coverage in this sample with 13 images overall. Drones
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comprised half of those images and were stand-alone images or infographics of U.S.
firepower. As in Griffin and Lee’s (1995) study, none of these images portrayed this
technology in action, rather they were portrayed as another member of the coalition force
with one a glossy portrait from the drone manufacturer (Figure 12) taken with the sky
lighted in a manner reminiscent of religious paintings, showing streams of light emerging
from the clouds, which in visual aesthetics theory is thought to impart more spiritual than
material concerns to the subject (Dake, 2005, p. 11).

Figure 12. Northrup Grumman-Landor, in Newsweek 151(23), 6.9.08, pp. 24-25.
In the post hoc review of images included in the Gulf War study, I coded the Gulf
War images according to my own coding guidelines. My coding generated fewer
“cataloging the arsenal” images than Griffin and Lee’s (1995) coding of the same images.
Despite differences in coding protocols, the conclusion that “cataloging the arsenal” was
a dominant category still seems justified given that coding during the Iraq War showed
fewer of the same qualitative type of images as those coded by Griffin and Lee.
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The estimated mean of the Gulf War study categories based on those reported in
Griffin and Lee’s (1995) study and adjusted for aggregation of some categories, was
approximately 25. The estimated mean for the Iraq War study, aggregating those
categories that overlapped in the same manner as was reported in the Gulf War study,
revealed a mean of 9. An F-test for the significance of the difference between the
variances of the two independent samples revealed p = <.0001. A t-Test of the two
different populations of images assuming unequal sample variances and a 95% C.I. has a
SE=10.69. As the sample means get larger, the more confident we can be that these two
populations of images reflect different populations of images, that there are genuine
differences between the populations of images, and that the respective samples are
representative of their particular parent populations. The null hypothesis can therefore
probably be rejected.
Of note is that images of American firepower (13) outstripped the number of
images of actual combat (10). Although the comparison does not approach the one to
nine ratio of combat to arsenal images published during the Gulf War study, images of
weaponry still slightly exceeded that of combat in coverage of the Iraq War. Due to
differences in coding protocols, statistical significance cannot be calculated between the
Gulf War and Iraq War studies. However, substantive increases in pictorial coverage of
troops and civilians suggest, that given access to troops and civilians through embedding,
journalists do not rely on representations of power to construct and frame the meaning of
war.
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One of the emergent categories, “Military Misconduct–U.S.” contained images
related to the Abu Ghraib scandal of U.S. Army prisoner abuse in 2003, as well as the
killing of 24 civilians by U.S. Marines in 2005, known as the Haditha Incident (McGirk,
2006, p. 34). Of the fourteen (14) images related to both incidents, eight (8) of them were
also categorized as “grisly.” One image connected to Abu Ghraib has become iconic and
was included in all three publications, although the image in the sample came from U.S.
News & World Report (Figure 13). The images were taken by the perpetrators of the
abuse and the quality of the images are less than adequate, but show a detainee in Abu
Ghraib attached to electrical wires that would deliver shocks during interrogation, or if he
fell off the pedestal.

Figure 13. Photographer unknown, AP in Washington Post,
in U.S. News & World Report 136(17), 5.17.04, p. 28.
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Most of the images documenting the Haditha killings showed the victims in shrouds
(Figure 14).

Figure 14. Lucian Read (photographer), WPN in Newsweek 147(24), 6.12.06, pp. 22-23.
The second largest genre pictured, “Civilian Life–Iraq,” had a 15% share of the
images published in the sample with 55 images. Of those images 25 were of women
and/or children, comprising 45% of the overall genre. The largest components of the
genre were the categories: “Women Civilians–Iraq,” “Civilian Wounded–Iraq,” and
“Civilian Dead–Iraq.”
The fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh largest genres were “Political–Iraq,”
constituting 11% with 38 images, “Military–U.S. (leaders),” constituting 9% with 33
images, “Military–Iraq,” constituting 7% with 24 images, and “Damage & Destruction–
Iraq” constituting 4% with 13 images. In the political category, the category “Political
Leaders–Iraq” constituted 50% of the category. At the beginning of the war in 2003,
Saddam Hussein dominated the political leader category until a provisional council was
established shortly after the invasion in April 2003, and speculation over future leaders of
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a parliamentary system of democracy included images of other possible leaders. Of the
19 images showing political leaders, 8 images were of Saddam Hussein, 2 of which
showed him after his capture in December 2003. Contrary to coverage during the Gulf
War and Griffin and Lee’s (1995) observation that images of Saddam Hussein were
juxtaposed across from images of George H.W. Bush as if they were confronting each
other (p. 818), coverage during the Iraq War had few such images. Images of Saddam
Hussein were used to depict him as a target and not necessarily as a legitimate political
leader. Particularly during the beginning of the war, Newsweek magazine used a graphic
element in the upper left border of articles that headed the section “Target: Iraq.”
The top six categories constituted 90% of the coverage, with U.S. military and
political categories amounting to 53% of the coverage with a total of 191 images, and
Iraqi civilian, political, military, and damage and destruction categories amounting to
37% of the coverage with 130 images. The balance of the images belonged to low
frequency categories with percentage values of 2.2% or less and amounting to 10% of the
overall coverage as shown in Table 2.
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Table 2
Low Frequency Categories in Iraq War Pictures
Category

Subcategory

Political–Allied

Leaders
Protesters
Protesters
Behind the lines
C-Patrol
Troops–Iran
Civilians
Journalist wound
Infographic
Civilians
Damage
Damage
Terrorist leader
Infographic
Terrorists
Damage
Terrorist–Dead

Political–Other
Military–Allied
Military–Other
Civilians–U. S.

Civilians–Other
Destruction–U.S.
Destruction–Other
Terrorism–Iraq

Photos

% of total

2
1
2
1
3
1
5
1
1
2
3
4
2
3
2
1
1

0.60
0.30
0.60
0.30
0.80
0.30
1.40
0.30
0.30
0.60
0.80
1.00
0.60
0.80
0.60
0.30
0.30

Terrorism–Other
Total

35

10.00

Image Mode
Archival images. Archival images were defined as images used to illustrate
something in the article, but not depicting action on the ground in Iraq. It could be from a
previous war, or a photograph of training going on in the U.S., or a photograph of a
person involved in the war that was not taken recently, but drawn from the sources
archives for whatever reason. The main point is that the photo was not taken close to the
time it was published.
Archival images comprised 6.7% of the total images under study. Many of these
photographs were images of Saddam Hussein, Osama bin Laden, and other political
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actors such as Muqtada al-Sadr, access to whom was not possible at the time. These
images appeared over and over again anchoring one image as the representative image of
these individuals. One image of Muqtada al-Sadr (Figure 15) shows him in a menacing
posture and a black cloak, which to American audiences, with little experience of Islamic
leaders or attire, might remind them of depictions of villains in film. The photograph is
similar to many other images of Muqtada al-Sadr in which he is pictured with a menacing

Figure 15. Wathiq Khuzaie (photographer), Getty Images, in Newsweek 148(23),
12.4.06, p. 29.
posture. The repeated use of this type of archival image develops an iconic and
metonymic reference for this individual and Islam in general (Nöth, 2011) to create a
stereotype.
Staged and posed images. There were not many photographs that seemed to be
staged at first glance during the coding process. Most of the photographs that were staged
were discovered to be staged through further inquiry by journalists or scholars. Two
particular instances in the sample, the toppling of the Saddam statue in Firdos Square,
and the rescue of Private Jessica Lynch are the examples in the study. In the case of the
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toppling of the Saddam statue, it would have been obvious to photographers that the tight
framing of the photographs omitted the paucity of civilian participation and framed the
image as a victory and punctuation for the end of the war (Fahmy, 2007). The image of
Jessica Lynch being transported to a German hospital after her rescue from an Iraqi
hospital was not a staged image, although the “story” of the Jessica Lynch rescue and the
details surrounding her capture misled the public. There were only two staged
photographs in the sample, one of which was the toppling of the Saddam statue, and the
second was an image promoting new “sci-fi” battle gear. It is not clear whether the
soldier photographed is indeed a soldier, or a model used to promote what is termed a
“future warrior” (Newsweek, 141/8, E2).
A distinction was made between staged photographs, in which there was an
intention to deceive on the part of the initiators and has been termed a “pseudo-event,”
(Baudrillard, 2012; Boorstin, 1992) and posed photographs such as those of troops killed
in action, or portraits of political and military leaders taken for the covers of magazines
and considered to be legitimate albeit conventional use of posed images. Posed images
were coded, and accounted for 10% of the total images with 36 photographs in the
sample. Most of these images were portraits of U.S. political or military leaders,
photographs of deceased U.S. troops taken before they were deployed, or pictures of U.S.
family members of the deceased.
Grisly images. Grisly images were defined as a type of image that shows
human(s) in extremis: distressed, wounded, or dead soldiers or civilians, or even the
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presence of blood suggesting a grisly incident. Grisly images were captured in three main
categories: “Military Misconduct–U.S.,” “Civilian Wounded–Iraq,” and “Civilian Dead–
Iraq.” As a percent of the total sample images, grisly images accounted for 9% of the
total images evenly divided between the U.S. category and the Iraq categories with
approximately 12 images each. Some of the grisly images were of U.S. wounded troops,
but qualitatively they were not as grisly as those of the wounded and dead Iraqi civilians
or of the Abu Ghraib prisoners of war and Haditha incident victims.
Infographics. Infographics including maps constituted a large percentage of the
sample images. Total images in the information graphic mode had content detailing
American firepower, maps of Iraq, traditional areas of Muslim religious denominations,
battles, and political support for the war in America. There were a total of 36 infographic
images, constituting 10% of the sample. Particularly in a war in which Western audiences
are unfamiliar with the culture and terrain of the Middle East, this is not surprising and
can be helpful to publics trying to make sense of the conflict.
Weighting Images by Size
In the original study, Griffin and Lee (1995) counted the number of images falling
into each category and then weighted the images according to size to see if the
prominence of a category was also reflected by the size of the image. They argued, “a
smaller number of pictures appearing in larger scale could have greater prominence than
a larger number of small pictures” (Griffin & Lee, 1995, p. 823). However, they found
that weighting for picture size made no appreciable difference to the frequency ranks of
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each category. The same top 18 categories of picture weight constituted 90% of the total,
with combat images being raised to 6% versus 3% of the total count because of a larger
and more prominent photograph size.
Weighting due to picture size did not change the ranking order of the top three
genres in this Iraq War study, yet the percentage share did shift downward without
exception. Contrary to Griffin and Lee’s (1995) Gulf War study in which weighting due
to picture size increased the combat category, the larger genre, “Military–U.S.” dropped
to 33.07% from the original 40%, “Civilian Life–Iraq” shifted to 10.6% of the sample,
down from the original 15%, and the category “Political–U.S.” also dropped slightly
from its original 13.4% to 8.13%. There could be many reasons for this, however, most
likely is the length of the conflict and the tendency of the news magazines to publish
smaller images toward the end of the conflict than at the beginning. Taking only the first
3 months of the war into account and weighting the sample images for that time only,
which would match the timeline of the Gulf War coverage, the genre “Military–U.S.”
garnered 69% of the images in contrast to 40% spread over the 9 years studied.
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Chapter 5: Discussion
The Iraq War was visually framed with a succession of frames diverging slightly
from Perlmutter’s (1992) contention that images used to represent war follow
conventional visual tropes about war, with a tendency toward action and U.S.-centric
images. While the visual representations of the Iraq War were primarily U.S.-centric,
photographs of action were rare, with photographs of traditional combat replaced by the
qualitatively disparate “combat patrol,” imagery. The emerging category “combat patrol”
could only be coded as combat as a latent content distinction, but manifestly resembled a
distinction made by Griffin and Lee (1995) of “unengaged troops” (p.819). On the whole,
the majority of the photography representing the Iraq War in Time, Newsweek, and U.S.
News & World Report, were mundane, or tropes at best. The imagery did not reflect
written accounts of the war, whether journalistic or published personal accounts (Hoyt &
Palattella, 2007). Given U.S. military embed protocols that allowed journalists access to
troops and civilians, the scant quantity of traditional combat photography (10%) is
surprising, suggesting that either the embed protocols did not allow access to the degree
necessary to gather combat images, or combat photography was edited out at the level of
the news organization. The military journalist, Colonel William Daley, reporting for the
Military Review, suggests that embedding only allowed you to “[see] the war through a
straw” (Hoyt & Palattella, 2007, p. 97). The lack of an exhaustive visual record of the
Iraq War in Time, Newsweek and U.S. News and World Report, has been influenced not
only by the embed policy acting as an indirect form of censorship, but also by editorial
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decisions and the tendency for the media to primarily use political and military entities as
information sources. It was also influenced by journalistic standards that require a second
source to verify reports. In the case of the Abu Ghraib scandal in 2003, journalists
interviewed after they returned reported that they were getting reports of abuse, but could
not publish due to their inability to verify personal accounts of torture, or were skeptical
of the reports due to what seemed like fantastical accounts of humiliation and abuse
(Hoyt & Palattella, 2007, p. 67). The Abu Ghraib photographs, in part taken by U.S.
Army specialist, Lynndie England, and the subsequent exposé in the New Yorker by
Seymour Hersch in April 2004 were the first time the abuse was confirmed by a
journalistic source (Hoyt & Palattella, 2007, p. 66).
Framing tropes and cultural assumptions
The U.S.-centric visual coverage conforms to an observed tendency by the media
to favor official sources for content thus reflecting the issues that those official sources
want to emphasize (Shoemaker, 1996). Images such as the individual archival portraits of
Iraqi politicians and military leaders as U.S. targets, or graphics of armaments intended to
accomplish that goal epitomized the U.S.-centric coverage and constructed a
conventional visual history of the “enemy.” Photographs of practicing troops, combat,
prisoners of war, and maps of the territory involved in the conflict all establish the
hurdles and barriers to the U.S. interest in a regime change, while assuming that there
were no other stakeholders that might have alternative plausible objectives.

War’s Visual Discourse: A Content Analysis of Iraq War Imagery

78

The increase in the combat category can be attributed to the coding of “C-patrol–
U.S.” as a combat category, with its emphasis on reconnaissance, surveillance, and
security operations, capturing the majority of the images, and can very probably be
attributed to embedding journalists with the troops. The rarity of traditional combat
photos in the study, however, is puzzling given the access to the troops, but is consistent
with recent war coverage (Griffin, 2010).
The U.S. embedding policy also acted as a mild form of censorship. Journalists
were not allowed to roam unaccompanied in Iraq or Baghdad to photograph anything
they pleased, which limited access to civilians unless troops were somehow engaged with
them. Only unembedded journalists who worked in Iraq outside the embed policy had the
freedom to photograph unimpeded, and usually at great risk to themselves and without
protection from U.S. or coalition troops. According to some unembedded photographers,
any attempt to walk away, even briefly, from the assigned military unit to cover some
action nearby could lead to that journalist losing his or her embed privileges (AbdulAhad, Alford, Anderson, & Leistner, 2005).
While a majority of the visual images documented U.S. interests and policies,
according to a PEW Research Center study (2007), just more than half of the textual
coverage was negative (56%), focusing more skeptically on the ability of the new Iraqi
government to attain stability in Iraq than negative assessments about U.S. policies or
overall success in U.S. goals in Iraq (PEW, December 19, 2007). This negative textual
wash would also influence how publics read the images.
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Photographs that perpetuated and supported U.S. cultural beliefs and assumptions
of U.S. goals were further supported by images of Iraqi civilians in the process of
fulfilling U.S. political and military objectives and policies in Iraq. For instance there
were many photographs of civilians voting—a representation of the sought for
democratization of Iraq. Images of civilian casualties that appeared were usually
attributed to the insurgents or not attributed to an agent at all. One 2003 Time photograph
showed a wounded 4-year-old girl being helped by U.S. marines and identified as “a
victim of crossfire” between locals and Saddam loyalists (Time, 141/14, 22-23). Another
2004 U.S. News photograph of an injured woman was described as “collateral damage”
of insurgent clashes with U.S. forces in Sadr City (U.S. News, 136/13, 32). Captions
tended to skirt any attribution of involvement on the part of the U.S. and allied forces in
the rising body count of opposing Iraqi forces or civilians. According to one journalist,
the military would decide when it was in their best interests to give an attribution or body
count of the opposing side and that did not happen very often (Hoyt & Palattella, 2007, p.
71). One image in the sample showed future Iraqi soldiers being trained by American
troops (U.S. News, 134/16, 20). Interestingly, the photograph pictured Iraqi troops sitting
in the dirt and listening, while U.S. troops were standing and demonstrating how to
restrain a captive. The caption reads, “Skull session: Instructing new Iraqi militiamen,”
and a headline, “The Men in the Shadows” referring to U.S. Special Forces as a model
for a new type of war. Another image shows an Iraqi and American soldier patrolling
together, with the Iraqi soldier taking point (U.S. News, 145/1, 28). While these images
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represent the transition to an Iraqi based presence, U.S. forces are still pictured in a
dominant position visually, usually standing while Iraqis are pictured sitting and looking
up.
There were few pictures of individuals working, going to school, or in their
homes. A pictorial essay of family life in the sample photographed by Farah Nosh, an
Iraqi/Canadian photojournalist, and published in Time magazine was an exception. The
black and white images were taken of Nosh’s family members and are in a subdued mood
with one showing a young boy smiling as he “dance[ed] to the beat of Eastern and
Western music” (Time, 167/21, 44-45). More than 50% of the photographs devoted to
civilians were of women and/or children. Although this might suggest that civilian life
was being represented, it is predominantly those aspects of civilian life that intersect with
U.S. military goals that were pictured—goals such as the establishment of democratic
practices or “roadblocks” to democracy in the form of insurgent fighting and their use of
“terrorist” tactics. Images of civilian Iraqi men were routinely older men, prisoners of
war, men in subjugating positions such as on their knees, or with their hands tied.
A Pew Research Center study on how the press covered events in Iraq in 2007,
confirmed journalists’ opinions that the subject matter they felt was “under covered” in
Iraq War coverage was ordinary Iraqi civilian life (PEW, December 19, 2007). The same
study found that 46.7% of the textual reporting covered daily violence. This number was
reflected to a slightly lower degree (43%) in the visual reporting. Images reflecting
violence showed: the results of bombings, armed insurgents and militiamen, the killings

War’s Visual Discourse: A Content Analysis of Iraq War Imagery

81

of the Blackwater contractors, and injured or dead civilians. Other photographs with less
violent themes (57%) showed grieving U.S. families, Iraqi refugees, veterans in the U.S.,
military and political leaders, and one “mixed” Muslim wedding between a Shi’ite and
Sunni.
These visual tropes were echoed in headlines and captions that tried to usher in a
conclusion to the war. Examples of such attempts in the sample included a 2003
photograph of the toppling of the statue of Saddam with the headline “Tyranny Tumbles:
Iraqis topple symbols of oppression as allied troops clash with Saddam holdouts,” and a
caption that reads, “Iraqis bring down a statue of Saddam in Baghdad with U.S. help”
(Time, 161/16, 5). The later realization that this was an action orchestrated by the C.I.A.
did little to dampen the symbolic value of the image as visual punctuation to the war
(Fahmy, 2007), giving a false sense of success with the symbolic value of the image
outweighing its value as a document of reality.
The PEW Research Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism in conjunction
with the Poynter Institute surveyed the American public in 2005 about its confidence in
the believability of U.S. print journalism. A shift took place in 2004 with only 50% of the
readership rating their primary print news source as believable, down 9% points from
2002 and 13% points from 1998—with no difference between national and local news
sources. There was also an increase in readership preferring pictures over words at 55%
indicating that television was the preferred source of news with only 40% preferring
written news or hearing about the news on the radio (PEW, March, 15, 2005).
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Visual counter-framing
Counter framing is defined as a frame that “opposes an earlier effective frame”
(Chong & Druckman, 2011) in that it appears later in time than an earlier effective frame,
creates a meaning in opposition to the previously accepted frame and also affects
opinions about the previously accepted frame. In the context of this study, the visual
counter-framing appears in two distinct respects. First, counter-framing appears as a
visual counterpoint to the textual headline or caption accompanying the photograph; and
second, as a visual counter-frame to deeply held social and cultural beliefs and
commitments.
Visual counter-framing of text
There were many instances in the sample of visual counter-framing of headlines.
While the caption might have accurately described what was taking place in the
photograph, the photograph’s representative task was in opposition to the headline it was
purported to represent. An early example in the study’s sample was a picture of Secretary
of State Colin Powell addressing the U.N. to assert the presence of weapons of mass
destruction in Iraq. There are many photographs of Secretary Powell holding a model vial
of Anthrax, but the photograph chosen to accompany the article, was one in which he was
pursing his lips as if inhaling cannabis (Time, 161/7, 26), perhaps a visual commentary
on the likelihood of weapons of mass destruction the U.S. administration was using to
justify the invasion of Iraq.
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p.26
Figure 16. Mike Segar (photographer). Reuters in Time 161(7), 3.17.03, p.26.
Similarly, a 2004 story entitled “Finishing the Job,” ((U.S. News, 135/23,, 28-29) with a
subtitle indicating that the U.S. was facing the challenge of “winning the peace” is belied
by the photograph used to illustrate it by showing a lone soldier seemingly lost amidst tall
grasses (Figure 17),, a metaphorical treatment suggesting that winning the peace was a
lost cause.

Figure 17. Damir Sagofj (photographer), Reuters in U.S. News & World Report
135(23), 1.5.04, pp. 28
28-29.
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A similar use of visual counter
counter-framing was used in one photograph picturing a
man in his home during
ng a U.S. house
house-to-house search. He is pictured on his knees,
holding up both hands with a water pistol in his right hand ((Newsweek,
Newsweek, 143/1,
143/1 37). With
the headline of “Operation Hearts & Minds,” tthe photograph seems either to mock U.S.
U.S
search tactics by portraying Iraqis as defenseless, or to mock the strength of the subject
using him as a metonym for Iraq, by the inclusion of a water pistol. As Nancy Youssef, a
journalist for Knight Ridder reported civilians saying, “Well, how can they
the win our hearts
and minds? They’re killing us. They’re killing us in at checkpoints; they’re killing us in
our houses. What hearts and minds are they talking about?” (Hoyt & Palattella, 2007, p.
72).

Figure 18. Gary Knight (photographer). Newsweek 143/1, 1.5.04, p. 37.
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Visual counter-framing of cultural commitments
One way to maintain a cultural commitment to the superiority of your armed
forces is to shift responsibility for outcomes to a different responsible party. In the case of
the Iraq War, the proximate goal of the war was regime change. The new Iraqi parliament
and newly trained armed forces were textually and visually framed as the new
responsible party, while U.S. involvement was portrayed as ancillary and supportive of
the new regime. A 2007 photograph by Guassem Zein is accompanied by text referring to
Iraqi forces in the third person and the problems “they” are facing. The headline reads,
“Apocalypse Now” (Newsweek, 149/7, 36-37), a reference to Francis Ford Coppola’s
epic Vietnam film of the same name. Responsibility for the future of the war is editorially
associated solely with Iraqi forces. Another shift of responsibility is suggested by the
photograph of a U.S. army officer as an advisor to Iraqi officers describing his job as
“armed social work” (Time, 148/25, 43). The dissonance between the two concepts of
social work and carrying a weapon suggests a cautious withdrawal and distancing from
the former position of armed soldier to one of social work and a cessation of active
warfare despite an increase in fatalities at the time of publication. Similarly, the headline
“On duty at the Alamo,” is accompanied by a photograph of a lone bespectacled soldier
patrolling along what appears to be a street of adult men watching him. The photograph
bridges the magazine fold to take up one third of the double page spread and is a
composite of two photographs visually joined at the fold. It is unknown if the two
photographs were taken at two different time periods, or is a cropped panoramic photo
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depicting actual events. The headline leaves no doubt that the defense of the area pictured
is a doomed enterprise, just as the battle for the Alamo was doomed by overwhelming
forces (Newsweek, 148/18
18, 46-47).
47). While the photograph and headline are in accord with
one another, both the photograph and article counter
counter-frame a deep cultural
ural belief and
accepted frame of the U.S. as an overwhelming and effective force of change in the
Middle East.
Images usedd metaphorically to illustrate the text also counter
counter-framed
framed the
psychological commitment to a U.S. military superiority as exemplified by the image of
an armored personnel carrier that was hit by a roadside bomb in Ramadi killing five U.S.
troops and juxtaposed
posed with a pal
palm tree in the background. The headline, “Broken Down”
not only refers to the personnel carrier, but obliquely also to the American Army in
general as the subheading indicates with: “What the war in Iraq had done to America’s
Army – and how to fix it”” ((Figure 19).

Figure 19. Yuri Kozyrev (photographer)
(photographer), in Time 169(16),
(16), 4.16.07, pp. 28-29.
28
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American discursive practices construct a war mythology weighted toward an
assumption of the just war and our troops as fair and principled individuals led by trained
and disciplined officers. Those cultural commitments are reinforced by film enactments
of past wars, in which average servicemen and women are portrayed as unambiguous
bearers of that mythology. Perhaps the most damaging photographs associated with the
Iraq War were the Abu Ghraib photographs that counter-framed the American mythology
with images of torture and abuse by American servicemen and –women. The Abu Ghraib
photographs in U.S. News & World Report used a textual variation of “shock and awe,” a
reference to the U.S. military strategy for rapid dominance, by headlining the article with
“Shocking and Awful” (U.S. News & World Report 136/17, 28-31). Another Newsweek
article examining how torture came to define the U.S. military engagement in Iraq
headlined the article with “The Roots of Torture” with a photograph of President George
W. Bush and Alberto Gonzalez, White House Attorney General (Newsweek 143 /21, 29).
This juxtaposition of the president and the headline suggested a causal relationship
between torture and President Bush, thus counter-framing a cultural commitment toward
America as the architect of democracy and fair play.
The publication of images of prisoner torture and abuse by U.S. military
personnel frames the Iraq War as a war coming apart at the seams and conducted in a
way contrary to deeply held cultural beliefs about America’s fairness and honor. Not only
public opinion in America was affected, but the photographs became evidence for
American allies, Iraqi combatants, and Iraqi civilians alike that considered the
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photographs evidence of practices, about which they had only heard rumors (Hoyt &
Palattella, 2007, p. 70).
According to a PEW study, the Abu Ghraib photographs influenced American
attitudes about the war by lowering public satisfaction with the war’s trajectory to 46%
from its stable 70% approval rating in January 2004 (PEW, May, 2004). However, on the
heels of the Abu Ghraib scandal and the early 2004 killing and desecration of four U.S.
Blackwater contractors, support for keeping troops in Iraq was still above average at
53%, with evaluations of the Bush presidency dropping to 44% (PEW, May, 2004). The
survey first primed the subjects by asking about Abu Ghraib images, which significantly
lowered approval ratings of President Bush. When asked further for opinions about
remaining in Iraq, the respondents favored remaining in Iraq until a stable democratic
government could be established. Priming and framing effects in how the questions were
asked by prefacing the question with questions about whether the respondents had seen
images of the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuses influenced the responses, after which questions
about staying to complete the mission reverted to other decision-making values (Chong &
Druckman, 2007).
In contrast, the political misconduct by U.S. administration insiders that leaked
classified information in retaliation for a report suggesting that they had knowledge
before the war began that no WMDs existed, was hardly registered or tracked by the
American public. The one photograph of Valerie Plame included in the sample pictured
her with a coy and flirtatious mien, framing Plame in a stereotyped negative gendered
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style, thus supporting the Bush Administration’s contention that she was not a CIA
operative. Only 23% of the American public said they paid close attention to the scandal.
Despite slightly partisan opinions from the Democrat and Independent parties favoring
resignation of Carl Rove for his suspected role in the scandal and the indictment of
Scooter Libby, Vice President Cheney’s Chief of Staff, the political scandal did not affect
attitudes about the war, according to a July 2005 survey (PEW, July 2005).
The visual framing of the Iraq War tended to follow the lead of the textual
framing, most of which contextualized the war in an episodic and conventional U.S.centric manner. However, textual and visual counter-framing was a subtle way to
undermine these conventions. Whether this counter-framing was exercised with editorial
intent or not, it could be construed as a clever device to reveal uncertainty with official
accounts of the war.
Images Not Seen or Pictures Not Taken
While a war is traditionally tied to a “conflict frame” (Neuman et al., 1992) or as
a “military conflict frame,” as Carpenter (2007) labels it in his analysis of newspaper
coverage of the Iraq War, a conflict frame would suggest that at least two stakeholders
with opposing objectives should be pictured. In this study not only was the coverage U.S.
–centric, but also devoid of representations of allies or other stakeholders with alternative
objectives, views, and solutions. An assumption of a conflict frame, however
conventional, can be informative by revealing what is absent in a war’s representation,
with the result that the photographs are not simply a type of visual communication; they
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are “the power to make visible” (Frosh, 2001, p. 43). As such, that which is not made
visible does not count in the meaning making equation of war.
In an empirical study it is difficult to talk about images or photographs that are
missing from the documentation of the war. We assume that if something is not part of
the documentation that it did not exist. However, it is incumbent on media scholars to
question what is missing, either because we want to see some aspect of coverage that has
not been included or should see some aspect of coverage that is glaringly missing. In this
sense it is legitimate to ask what is not being shown.
The lack of photographs of civilians going about their daily lives or civilians in
professional capacities is noteworthy. Civilian casualties are historically the highest
during war. If we think of civilians as stakeholders in the outcome of war, then they are
stakeholders that are not being pictured to the same extent that they are impacted by war.
The embed system allowed for closer coverage of the military, but according to personal
accounts by journalists, this did not necessarily translate into increased coverage of, or
proximity to, civilians. At the start of the war, civilians felt safe talking to journalists, but
because of embedding, journalists started to be considered part of the military and it
became dangerous for civilians to talk to journalists for fear of being targeted by
insurgents as sympathizers (Hoyt & Palattella, 2007, pp. 19-20). This suggests that aside
from structural media processes and editorial pressures, what got pictured was also
influenced by events on the ground and Iraqi cultural assumptions about journalists in
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general, who, during the Saddam Hussein regime, were thought to work for Iraqi
intelligence and were therefore avoided (Hoyt & Palattella, 2007, p. 37).
Also noteworthy is the lack of photographs of American civilian contractors to
whom the rebuilding of Iraq was outsourced. These multinational corporations, such as
Bechtel and Halliburton received very little coverage and, with the exception of
Blackwater security forces protecting Paul Bremer in his role as Administrator of the
Coalition Provisional Authority of Iraq, and the killing of Blackwater employees in 2004,
there were no images of employees providing services that were formerly provided by the
armed services itself, such as provisioning of water, food stuffs, and mess services, to the
U.S. military. Given complaints about the effectiveness of these profit-motivated
enterprises, it is noteworthy that coverage of these services was not included in visual
representations of the war. Nor were reconstruction efforts by these corporations to
restore water, sewer, and communication services to the Iraqi people visually represented.
As mentioned before, particularly images of efforts to restore oil production were not
pictured despite the Iraqi Oil Ministry in Baghdad being the only structure that was
protected and guarded by U.S. and coalition troops at the beginning of the war (Hoyt &
Palattella, 2007, p. 31). In order to interview officials of these international corporations,
journalists had to get permission to enter the Green Zone, a highly fortified zone in
central Baghdad. The Green Zone was the former site of the Republican Palace and
during the Iraq War was the site of the Coalition Provisional Authority. It was also the
base for international contractors such as Halliburton and Bechtel. The paperwork
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required for journalists to get into the Green Zone was extensive, sometimes taking two
months to complete. According to some journalists, they were bureaucratically locked out
of the Green Zone, and the Green Zone was isolated from the realities of what was
happening in Iraq (Hoyt & Palattella, 2007, p. 52).
Political rhetoric at the beginning of the war in Afghanistan (2001) and the Iraq
war (2003) connected these wars with the Crusades suggesting the wars were also
religious in nature. While there were some photographs of troops and civilians praying in
primarily Christian and Muslim traditions, religious imagery did not dominate any of the
categories. Of the 356 photographs in the sample, only 7 included religious overtones
through the inclusion of praying postures, or religious iconography. However, articles
devoted to explicating Islam, the differences between different Muslim sects, or articles
on Christianity were placed in close proximity to articles on the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan in all three publications.
As discussed in the literature review, the visual framing of the Iraq War has
implications for historical, cultural, and journalistic ways of constructing a dialogue
about war’s meaning. It is historical in the sense that an accurate visual depiction of war
does not get recorded at the time it is occurring. It is cultural in the sense that an
understanding of the causes and complexity of a particular war are not distinguished from
war tropes and mythologies that stand in for the realities of war (Hallin & Gitlin, 1993).
Finally, it is journalistic in the sense that constraints on coverage during war should not
interfere with the social responsibility of the journalist to inform the public (Allan &
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Zelizer, 2003). Embedding influenced what was covered, and sometimes acted as a form
of indirect censorship. Embedding also influenced the perceptions of Iraqi civilians
toward journalists, cutting off access to civilians as stakeholders in the picturing of the
war, and eventually positioning journalists as targets themselves rather than third party
objective observers. This had consequences for how the war was framed and counterframed.
Limitations
The main internal limitation to the study, particularly as it concerns comparisons
to the previous Gulf War study, is the possibility of different parameters for category
inclusion. Particularly for the category “cataloging the arsenal,” the high count of Griffin
and Lee’s (1995) study and the relatively low category count in this Iraq War study
reflected a marked difference. In my post hoc review of the population of images used in
the Gulf War study, and my lower count of “cataloging the arsenal” photographs using
my categorization protocols makes the comparison of this particular category impossible.
This study considered one graphic image containing many separate illustrations of
armaments as one instance of the category. It is unknown if the same protocol was used
in the Gulf War study. Similarly, this study considered “C-patrol” a combat category, and
not “unengaged troops” as I suspect the Griffin and Lee (1995) study did. Again, this is a
possible difference in coding protocol that affects comparisons between studies.
As a sample of a larger census of photographs, this study captured the main
events and themes of the Iraq War and is largely generalizable to the larger population of
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photographs in these news magazines. Despite this generalizability, there were gaps in
coverage of particular events such as the U.S. and allied phosphorus bombing of Fallujah
in 2004. Concurrently, the results cannot be generalized to media coverage on different
platforms such as television, extended coverage in online news magazines, blogs, or
constructed pictorial accounts in books about the Iraq War.
Implications for Future Research
Censorship protocols of the military will undoubtedly change in the future to
control the use of smart phones by military personnel to document their experiences and
possible publication to social media. In the future, framing research will have to account
for the effect that a lack of censorship exerts when individuals can disseminate
information and transmit photographs immediately in some type of “direct-to-consumer”
social networking process. By bypassing the traditional mass media discursive monopoly,
the mechanisms of a mass media frame generation will be affected or become irrelevant
(Bennett & Iyengar, 2008). Visual information may also have unintended consequences
when the audience is a global audience with access to the Internet and conflicting
interests. Because photographs have no propositional syntax and can be contextually
isolated, they can become meaning-making vehicles for opposing interests.
As the visual turn of news generation continues, more studies and surveys of the
effects of visual materials can help to ascribe causal consequences, thought by Snow,
Rochford, Worden, and Benford (1986) to be one of the goals of framing analysis. The
PEW survey that included references to the Abu Ghraib visual materials is such an
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example (May, 2004), with respondents clearly influenced by the images and evaluating
the arch of the war negatively because of them. Experimental models to evaluate the
effects of images on publics with differing interests and stakes in a war will be crucial to
an understanding of how the lack of propositional syntax in visual communication affects
publics. Future research could also target the effect of grisly photography as it relates to
war vs. natural disaster to assess whether the impact of this type of photography is related
to qualitative aspects of the photography or to values associated with who or what is
responsible for the represented tragedy or catastrophe.
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Appendix A: Coding Categories
Publication:
Date
Volume (Issue)
Section / Page
Image No:
Photographer / graphic artist
Affiliation
Source of photo / image
Color / Black & White
Size of photo:
Headline
Sub-head
Caption
Pictorial Genre/Type of Image:
Political
Military
Civilian life
Damage and Destruction
Terrorism (emergent)
DETAILS:
Mode:
Grisly – human(s) in extremis
Archival file photos (government/
news agency, publication)
Staged
Posed (emergent)
Infographics / Illustrations/
Graph/ Table
Map
DETAILS:
People:
Political leaders
Military leaders
Terrorist leaders (emergent)
Soldiers/Troops
Veterans (emergent)
POWs
Civilians
Civilian Insurgents (emergent)
Women / Children
Protesters/Public
demonstrations
Types of Warfare / Weaponry:
Combat
C-Patrol (emergent)
Behind the lines (Bivouac,

Time

Newsweek

U.S. News and World Report

2-pg. Spread Full Page Half Page

Quarter Page

< Quarter

U.S.

Allied

Iraq

Other

U.S.

Allied

Iraq

Other

U.S.

Allied

Iraq

Other
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practice)
"Cataloging the Arsenal"
Jets/helicopters/
Humvees/Tanks/Naval vessels,
missiles
Drones
Casualties:
Political wounded (emergent)
Political dead (emergent)
Military wounded
Military dead
Civilian wounded
Civilian dead
Terrorist wounded (emergent)
Terrorist dead (emergent)
Ceremonial (funerals, dress
uniform)
Coffins
Destruction:
Infrastructure
Oil and energy
Ecological subjects
Misc. Emergent Categories:
Political Misconduct
Military Misconduct
Political - Guantanamo

U.S.

Allied

Iraq

Other

U.S.

Allied

Iraq

Other

U.S.

Iraq
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Appendix B: Codebook
Coding Protocols
Coding Unit

The coding unit is one photograph

Context Unit

Name of publication (Time, Newsweek, U.S. News and World
Report)

Categories
The primary researcher will complete the information below:
Date Published

Date of the magazine edition, usually on the front cover.
Format: Month.Day.Year xx/xx/xx

Volume/ (Issue)

The newsmagazine Volume and Issue numbers will be noted.

Page No.

The newsmagazine page number on which the image appears.

Image No.

Each photograph/image will be assigned a number before coders
come into contact with the coding document.

Photographer

Name of the photographer (if listed)

Affiliation

Name of the wire services, staff photographer or media corp.
Please note if this information is not available with NA.

Source of Photo

Name of the source of the photo. Same as above unless noted as
archival or image from different source such as Getty Images,
US Government./Military, Defense Contractor (Raytheon,
McDonnell Douglas), etc.

Color
Black & White

Note whether a photograph is in color or black and white with the
designation C or B/W.

Size of Photo

The dimensions of the photograph as follows:
2-pg. spread / full / half / quarter / < quarter

Headline

Note the exact wording in the headline of the article.
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Subheading

Note the exact wording in the subhead of the article.

Caption

Note the exact wording of the caption accompanying the image.

Coders:

Please code a genre and as many details per photo as seem
appropriate.
If there is a photograph that you find particularly interesting,
please feel free to note your impressions somewhere on the
coding sheet.

Type of Image (Pictorial Genre)
Genre Codes:

Each photograph or image will usually have a focus that allows
it to be categorized as a certain genre.
One of the genre codes can usually be assigned to that photograph.
For example: A photograph that shows President Bush on a
battleship would only be coded as “political leader” and not
additionally for the battleship or the troops that might be watching
the speech. It is clear from the centrality of President Bush’s
placement, that he is the subject of the photograph.
If an image is “political” and also a mode code “archival” image,
please check both of those codes.

Detail Codes

Each photograph or image will also have details that should be
noted. See codes below: mode, people, cataloging the arsenal,
casualties, and destruction/damage.
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Genre Codes

Political

A type of image whose focus is on political issues dealing with the
war and also political leaders. For example: indicted political
players, or political leaders meeting dignitaries, giving a speech,
getting in a car or out of a helicopter, attending a meeting, etc.
Please differentiate between whether those pictured are:
U.S., Allied, or Iraqi political leaders and the name of the leader (if
known).
Leaders that are not allied leaders, such as Gerhard
Schröder of Germany, or Jacques Chirac of France, should be
listed under “Other.” If they are all in the same picture
together, then list everyone that is in the photograph.
There might be some questions regarding whether to code Colin
Powell as military or political. In this case, during the War in Iraq,
Colin Powell was a political appointee and therefore should be
coded as political.
Likewise, Donald Rumsfeld, although he was Secretary of Defense
and oversaw the Pentagon, was a political appointee and
therefore should be coded as a political leader.

Military

A type of photograph that centers on military activity.
This code also include leaders such as generals in the field or
behind the scenes. Please differentiate between U.S., Allied, and
Iraqi, or Other military leaders. Fill in a name if known or
available.
Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff and other such officers,
although they are political appointees, are advisors because they
have risen through the ranks of the military. Such advisors should
be coded as military.

Wartime Civilian
Life

A type of photo that documents everyday life in Iraq or in America
or its Allies’ home countries. For example, people going to work,
school, church or mosque, et cetera.
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This should NOT include images of civilians being detained or
questioned by troops (which should be coded as military). While
this questioning or searching someone’s home does “happen”
during wartime, it is not a daily occurrence for the civilian
population. I am more interested in documenting whether
photographs of people going to work/school or carrying on
with their lives are reflected in the corpus of photographs.
Protesters should not be included in this group.
Damage and
Destruction

A type of image whose focus is the destruction of infrastructure:
buildings, mosques, resources (oil/water/food), bridges, et cetera.

Terrorism

A type of photograph that centers on terrorist activity and/or
leaders as identified by the media. This category should not
include civilian insurgents in Iraq despite their use of terrorist
tactics.

Detail Codes
In addition to a genre code there will be details in the photograph that will be
subcategories of the genre.
Mode
Grisly

A type of image that shows human(s) in extremis:
distressed, wounded, or dead soldiers or civilians. Again, please
differentiate between U.S., Allied, or Iraqi soldiers or civilians and
if a face is visible or a name published.

Archival File Photos A type of image used to illustrate something in the article, but does
not necessarily depict action on the ground in Iraq. It could be
from a previous war, or be of training going on in the US from a
different war. The main point is that the photo was not taken
close to the time it was published.
Posed:

A type of image that is posed as in portraiture. A designation as
posed should not carry any negative connotation. Images of this
sort could occur in any genre. Politicians and military leaders
might be posed for a portrait for the cover of a magazine and
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might be less spontaneous than an action shot. Many times
posed photographs, or portraits of soldiers will stand in for them
if more spontaneous photos are not available or are considered
in bad taste, such as memorial photographs when they
have died.
Staged:

There are photos that are staged to reenact a battle scene with no
intention to deceive. Usually these photos are accompanied by
some indication that the scene is staged or is from a past
war/conflict zone.
There are also some images that were originally published
and have since become known to be staged in the sense of “fake.”
They are intended to deceive or give a false impression. If you
notice such a photo, please make a note. One such example is the
toppling of the Saddam Hussein statue.

Infographic,
Illustration

A type of image that might illustrate an encampment or building,
an explanation of how a weapon works, or infographics
detailing the course of a battle. If the illustration depicts a weapon
or arsenal technology, the image will also be coded in that genre
category.

Map

A type of image that shows the territory in which the war is taking
place, or the relationship between different groups, such as Sunnis,
Shi’ites, Kurds, et cetera.

People
Political Leaders

Political leaders of the U.S., Iraq, or Allied countries (see here:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multi-National_Force_–_Iraq

Military Leaders

Persons identifiable as a military leader through recognition,
caption, or text. Please write down the name of the military leader.

Terrorist Leaders

Usually internationally active individuals that use tactics of terror,
such as suicide bombings to attain political aims (This
definition is used in full recognition of the difficulty and ambiguity
of this term). Typically it is used to designate individuals whose
political aims are not allied with a particular state, but are more
ideological in nature.
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Soldiers/Troops

An individual or group of soldier(s) or pilot(s) is pictured.
Typically even a single soldier can be referred to in the plural
as “troops.”

POWs

Combatants that have been detained, shown captured, whether on
the battlefield or detained somewhere else. If they are detained
somewhere else, key words used might be “extraordinary
rendition” or simply “rendition.” Again, please differentiate
between U.S., Allied, or Iraqi combatants.

Civilians

Any person pictured and not connected to the military.
Again, please differentiate between U.S., Allied, Iraqi, or Other
civilians.

Civilian Insurgents

Iraqi civilians (Sunni and/or Shi’ite, aka Shia) that used
guerilla tactics to fight against the change in power structure after
the democratic elections. Often these tactics target other
Iraqi civilians, civilian police, or U.S. armed forces.

Veterans

U.S. veterans from former or current wars that are pictured
regarding veteran benefits, future plans, healing, adjusting
to civilian life, honoring other soldiers, running for political
office, et cetera.

Protesters

Images that show civilians protesting against the war from any
country. Please indicate from which county.

Women and/or
Children

Any photograph in which women and/or children are the main
focus of the image. Again, please differentiate between U.S.,
Allied, or Iraqi women and/or children.

Types of Warfare and Weaponry
Combat

A type of image that shows soldiers in direct active combat with
the enemy.
It should not include practicing behind the lines, which sometimes
can look like active combat. Again, please differentiate between
U.S., Allied (which ally), Iraqi, or Other combatants.
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A designation as C-patrol should include soldiers on patrol,
advancing in the theater of operations, searching residences, or
individuals.
Again, please differentiate between U.S., Allied (which ally), or
Iraqi combatants.

Behind the lines

A type of image that documents soldiers behind the lines, relaxing,
exercising, training for combat, playing sports, et cetera.

Weaponry/Arsenal

This category is meant to keep track of images that seem to
list or “promote” the extensive firepower of the U.S. military. It is
NOT meant to include every instance in photographs or images
that include a tank or airplane.

Jets/ Helicopters
Humvees/Tanks
Naval Vessels
Missiles/ IEDs/
Electronic
explosive devices

Graphic images/drawings, photographs or diagrams in which the
subject of the image is jets, airplanes, helicopters, humvees
tanks, naval vessels, missiles, IEDs, EEDs, et cetera.

Drones

Graphic images/drawings, photographs or diagrams in which the
subject of the image is drones used to deliver missiles, bombs or
surveillance technology.

Casualties
Political Wounded

Photographs that include political individuals injured in the
performance of their duties. Please differentiate between U.S.,
Allied, Iraqi, or Other politicians.

Political Dead

Photographs that include political individuals who were
assassinated or died in the performance of their duties or
because of their political role. Please differentiate between U.S.,
Allied, Iraqi, or Other individuals.

Military Wounded

Photographs that include soldiers injured on the battlefield or
recovering in a hospital. If in a hospital, please indicate where the
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hospital is located and please differentiate between U.S., Allied,
Iraqi, or Other soldiers.
Military Dead

Photographs that include dead soldiers in the field, in a morgue,
in a hospital, or represented by a funeral, casket, or symbolic
representations such as family photographs, et cetera.
Please note in the space provided whether the face is
visible or covered and whether the body is exposed (naked) or not.
Please differentiate between U.S., Allies, Iraqi, or insurgent, or
Other dead.

Civilian Wounded

Photographs that include injured civilians. Civilians are usually
referred to as “collateral damage,” civilians, or some indication
that the subject of the photograph is not a member of military
personnel. The exception to this designation will be civilian
insurgents. Please note whether the pictured wounded are
civilians and/or civilian insurgents.

Civilian Dead

Photographs that include dead civilians in a hospital, morgue,
at a funeral, or on the street. Please note in the space provided
whether the face is visible or covered and whether the body is
exposed (naked) or not. This detail code will include
civilian insurgents usually designated as such in the caption. Please
make a note that those pictured are insurgents.

Terrorist wounded

Photographs that include injured terrorists, or those identified
as terrorists by the media.

Terrorist dead

Photographs that include dead terrorists, or those identified as
terrorists by the media. This will include representative
photographs. Please note in the space provided whether the face is
visible or covered.

Ceremonial

A type of photo that documents ceremonies such as military
honors, funerals, in Iraq or in America or its Allies’ home
countries.

Also include the implied dead such as pictures of people grieving or pictures of
coffins/graves. Please note that death is implied and how. Please differentiate between
U.S., Allied, Iraqi civilians, or other (specify).
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From approximately 2004–2007, an Iraqi insurgency against coalition forces took place.
Iraqis that collaborated with the U.S., such as police, were a prominent target, leading to
large numbers of Iraqi civilian deaths.

Destruction and Damage
War Damage

Images that show the destruction of government buildings and
hospitals; cultural landmarks such as museums and mosques,
destruction of neighborhoods and interruptions of activities of
daily living such as going to school or work.

Oil and Energy

Images that show the destruction of oil fields, reserves, et cetera.

Ecological Subjects

Images that show the destruction of agriculture, water,
environment, and/or animals.

Emergent Categories
If, while coding, you notice a category or a detail that you believe needs to be
added to the code sheet, please contact me via email and we can discuss it with all coders
and come to a consensus about what code to use for those types of images/details.
Sometimes there will be details that can simply be added to the codes already assigned by
adding it to the code area already supplied.
Coding Decisions
Some of the photographs will include elements that suggest two genres. For
instance, you might be coding a photograph that has 3 soldiers driving in a tank. You
might wonder if you should code for both of those categories. The answer is NO. Very
likely the main focal point of the photograph is the soldiers. You would then code it as
“military” and would not code it for the vehicle. However, there might be a photograph
of an aircraft carrier taken from a distance with troops lined up in formation on the deck.
The prominence of the aircraft carrier and the relative diminutive nature of the troops
should lead you to code the photograph as “naval vessel.” If however, you judge that the
reason the photograph is taken from a distance is to show the size of a battalion, then it
would be coded for troops. Sometimes the caption will indicate how the photograph
should be read.
If, while coding, two genres seem relevant to a coding unit, please make your best
decision and clarify why you feel that decision outweighs coding in another genre. Make
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a note of your second choice of genre. If continual questions arise, please contact me so
that coding instructions can be clarified, or additional training and examples can be
given.
Coding Questions
Coding questions or the application of a new emergent code will be resolved by
finding consensus between all coders. If the questions are the result of instructions
regarding the coding or categories, the codebook will be revised and further training
provided.
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Appendix C: Tables
Table 3
Intercoder Agreement per Category Using Cohen’s Kappa
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Category

Total Agreement

Coder 1 & 3

Coder 1 & 2

Coder 2 & 3

Genre:
Political–U.S.
Political–Allied
Political–Iraq
Political–Other
Military–U.S.
Military–Allied
Military–Iraq
Civilians–U.S.
Civilians–Iraq
Terrorism–Iraq
Terrorism–Other
Destruction–Iraq
Destruction–Other
Genre Subtotal

0.975
0.333
0.822
0.775
0.847
1.000
0.363
0.534
0.785
0.130
0.827
0.923
1.000
0.720

1.000
0.000
0.826
0.663
0.902
1.000
0.387
0.558
0.762
0.000
1.000
0.884
1.000
0.690

0.962
1.000
0.850
1.000
0.845
1.000
0.387
0.658
0.854
0.391
0.741
1.000
1.000
0.820

1.000
0.000
0.774
0.663
0.793
1.000
0.315
0.387
0.738
0.000
0.741
0.884
1.000
0.640

Mode:
Archival–U.S.
Archival–Iraq
Info-graphics–U.S.
Info-graphics–Iraq
Map–Iraq
Mode Subtotal

0.779
0.164
0.826
0.749
0.815
0.670

0.799
0.000
0.741
0.741
0.741
0.600

0.673
0.493
0.853
0.653
0.853
0.710

1.000
0.000
0.884
0.853
0.853
0.720

People:
Political leader–U.S.
Political leader–Iraq
Political leader–Other
Military leader–U.S.
Terrorist–Other
Soldiers/Troops–U.S.
Soldiers/Troops–Allied
Soldiers/Troops–Iraq
Soldiers/Troops–Other
Combat–U.S.
C-Patrol–U.S.
C-Patrol–Iraq
Grisly–U.S.
Grisly–Iraq
Behind-the-Lines–U.S.

1.000
0.815
0.662
1.000
0.775
0.905
1.000
0.707
1.000
0.827
0.713
0.769
0.660
0.975
0.775

1.000
0.865
0.493
1.000
0.663
0.882
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.904
0.658
1.000
0.962
0.663

1.000
0.847
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.976
1.000
0.560
1.000
0.741
0.582
0.853
0.491
0.962
0.663

1.000
0.731
0.493
1.000
0.663
0.856
1.000
0.560
1.000
0.741
0.653
0.796
0.491
1.000
1.000
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Table 3
Intercoder Agreement per Category using Cohen’s Kappa (continued)
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Category
Average Agreement
People:
Behind-the-Lines–Allied
1.000
Veterans–U.S.
1.000
P.O.W.–Iraq
0.936
Civilian life – Iraq
0.850
Civilian life–Other
0.775
Insurgents–Iraq
0.826
Protesters–Iraq
1.000
Protesters–Other
1.000
Women & Children–U.S.
0.864
Women & Children–Iraq
0.884
People Subtotal
0.870

Coder 1 & 3

Coder 1 & 2

Coder 2 & 3

1.000
1.000
0.904
0.780
0.663
0.884
1.000
1.000
0.796
0.960
0.880

1.000
1.000
0.904
0.890
1.000
0.853
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.826
0.890

1.000
1.000
1.000
0.879
0.663
0.741
1.000
1.000
0.796
0.865
0.830

Arsenal:
Cataloging the Arsenal–U.S.
Drones–U.S.
Arsenal Subtotal

0.902
1.000
0.950

0.853
1.000
0.930

0.853
1.000
0.930

1.000
1.000
1.000

Casualties:
Political Dead–Iraq
Military Wounded–U.S.
Military Dead–U.S.
Military Dead–Iraq
Civilian Wounded–Iraq
Civilian Wounded–Other
Civilian Dead–Iraq
Civilian Dead–Other
Ceremonial–U.S.
Coffins–U.S.
Coffins–Iraq
Casualty Subtotal

1.000
0.826
0.936
1.000
0.902
0.333
0.776
1.000
0.864
1.000
0.333
0.820

1.000
0.884
1.000
1.000
0.853
0.000
0.790
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.000
0.780

1.000
0.741
0.904
1.000
1.000
0.000
0.884
1.000
0.796
1.000
1.000
0.850

1.000
0.853
0.904
1.000
0.853
1.000
0.653
1.000
0.796
1.000
0.000
0.820

Damage & Destruction:
Destruction–U.S.
Destruction–Iraq
Destruction–Other
Damage Subtotal

1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000

1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000

1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000

1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000

Emergent Categories
Military Misconduct–U.S.
Emergent Subtotal

0.940
0.940

0.910
0.910

1.000
1.000

0.910
0.910

Total Reliability

0.856

0.830

0.890

0.850
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Table 4
Statistical Significance of Iraq War Categorical Relationships
Category

n = 356

df = 1

Chi Square*

U.S. Political Leader / U.S. Military
U.S. Political Leader / U.S. Military Leaders
U.S. Political Leader / U.S. Troops
U.S. Political Leader / U.S. Behind the lines troops
U.S. Political Leader / U.S Combat
U.S. Political Leader / U.S. Combat Patrol
U.S. Political Leader / U.S. Military Wounded
U.S. Political Leader / U.S. Military Dead
U.S. Political Leader / U.S. Veteran
U.S. Political Leader / U.S. Military Misconduct
U.S. Political Leader / U.S. Armaments

.783
.536
.378
.137
.378
.087
.277
.313
.783
.294
.313

U.S. Political Misconduct / U.S. Military
U.S. Political Misconduct / U.S. Military Leaders
U.S. Political Misconduct / U.S. Troops
U.S. Political Misconduct / U.S. Behind the Lines Troops
U.S. Political Misconduct / U.S. Combat
U.S. Political Misconduct / U.S. Combat Patrol
U.S. Political Misconduct / U.S. Military Wounded
U.S. Political Misconduct / U.S. Military Dead
U.S. Political Misconduct / U.S. Veteran
U.S. Political Misconduct / U.S. Military Misconduct
U.S. Political Misconduct / U.S. Armaments

.879
.733
.627
.412
.627
.345
.549
.578
.879
.563
.578

U.S. Protesters / U.S. Military
U.S. Protesters / U.S. Military Leaders
U.S. Protesters / U.S. Troops
U.S. Protesters / U.S. Behind the Lines Troops
U.S. Protesters / U.S. Combat
U.S. Protesters / U.S. Combat Patrol
U.S. Protesters / U.S. Military Wounded
U.S. Protesters / U.S. Military Dead
U.S. Protesters / U.S. Veteran
U.S. Protesters / U.S. Military Misconduct
U.S. Protesters / U.S. Armaments

.915
.810
.732
.564
.732
.507
.673
.695
.915
.684
.695

U.S. Political Guantanamo / U.S. Military
U.S. Political Guantanamo / U.S. Military Leaders

.896
.786

*

Note. All calculations based on n=356 and df =1. All Chi Square calculations are not significant (n.s.)
unless marked with an asterisk (*) indicating values <.05, thus significant.
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Table 4
Statistical Significance of Iraq War Categorical Relationships

Category

n = 356

df = 1

Chi Square*

U.S. Political Guantanamo / U.S. Behind the Lines Troops
U.S. Political Guantanamo / U.S. Combat
U.S. Political Guantanamo / U.S. Combat Patrol
U.S. Political Guantanamo / U.S. Military Wounded
U.S. Political Guantanamo / U.S. Military Dead
U.S. Political Guantanamo / U.S. Veteran
U.S. Political Guantanamo / U.S. Military Misconduct
U.S. Political Guantanamo / U.S. Armaments

.479
.675
.415
.604
.631
.896
.617
.631

U.S. Political Dead / U.S. Military
U.S. Political Dead / U.S. Military Leaders
U.S. Political Dead / U.S. Troops
U.S. Political Dead / U.S. Behind the lines troops
U.S. Political Dead / U.S. Combat
U.S. Political Dead / U.S. Combat Patrol
U.S. Political Dead / U.S. Military Wounded
U.S. Political Dead / U.S. Military Dead
U.S. Political Dead / U.S. Veterans
U.S. Political Dead / U.S. Military Misconduct
U.S. Political Dead / U.S. Armaments

.958
.905
.865
.774
.865
.741
.834
.845
.958
.839
.845

U.S. Political Leader / Iraq Political
U.S. Political Leader / Iraq Political Leader
U.S. Political Leader / Iraq Protesters
U.S. Political Leader / Iraq Political Dead
U.S. Political Leader / Iraq Political Misconduct

.354
.218
.697
.783
.580

U.S. Political Misconduct / Iraq Political
U.S. Political Misconduct / Iraq Political Leader
U.S. Political Misconduct / Iraq Protesters
U.S. Political Misconduct / Iraq Political Dead
U.S. Political Misconduct / Iraq Political Misconduct

.609
.497
.830
.879
.760

U.S. Protesters / Iraq Political
U.S. Protesters / Iraq Political Leader
U.S. Protesters / Iraq Protesters
U.S. Protesters / Iraq Political Dead
U.S. Protesters / Iraq Political Misconduct

.719
.633
.880
.915
.830
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Table 4
Statistical Significance of Iraq War Categorical Relationships

Category

n = 356

df = 1

Chi Square*

U.S. Political Guantanamo / Iraq Political
U.S. Political Guantanamo / Iraq Political Leader
U.S. Political Guantanamo / Iraq Protesters
U.S. Political Guantanamo / Iraq Political Dead
U.S. Political Guantanamo / Iraq Political Misconduct

.659
.557
.853
.897
.000

U.S. Political Dead / Iraq Political
U.S. Political Dead / Iraq Political Leader
U.S. Political Dead / Iraq Protesters
U.S. Political Dead / Iraq Political Dead
U.S. Political Dead / Iraq Political Misconduct

.858
.812
.940
.958
.915

Allied Political Leader / Iraq Political
Allied Political Leader / Iraq Political Leader
Allied Political Leader / Iraq Protesters
Allied Political Leader / Iraq Political Dead
Allied Political Leader / Iraq Political Misconduct

.800
.736
.915
.940
.880

Allied Protesters / Iraq Political
Allied Protesters / Iraq Political Leader
Allied Protesters / Iraq Protesters
Allied Protesters / Iraq Political Dead
Allied Protesters / Iraq Political Misconduct

.858
.812
.940
.958
.915

U.S. Military / Iraq Military
U.S. Military / Iraq Troops
U.S. Military / Iraq Patrol
U.S. Military / Iraq Insurgents
U.S. Military / Iraq POW
U.S. Military / Iraq Arsenal
U.S. Military / Iraq Military Misconduct

.958
.940
.958
.852
.958
.940
.926

U.S. Military Leader / Iraq Military
U.S. Military Leader / Iraq Troops
U.S. Military Leader / Iraq Patrol
U.S. Military Leader / Iraq Insurgents
U.S. Military Leader / Iraq POW
U.S. Military Leader / Iraq Arsenal
U.S. Military Leader / Iraq Military Misconduct

.905
.866
.905
.674
.905
.866
.836

U.S. Troops / Iraq Military
U.S. Troops / Iraq Troops
U.S. Troops / Iraq Patrol
U.S. Military / Iraq Insurgents

.865
.809
.865
.549
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Table 4
Statistical Significance of Iraq War Categorical Relationships

Category

n = 356

df = 1

Chi Square*

U.S. Troops / Iraq POW
U.S. Troops / Iraq Arsenal
U.S. Troops / Iraq Military Misconduct

.865
.809
.767

U.S. Behind the Lines / Iraq Military
U.S. Behind the Lines / Iraq Troops
U.S. Behind the Lines / Iraq Patrol
U.S. Behind the Lines / Iraq Insurgents
U.S. Behind the Lines / Iraq POW
U.S. Behind the Lines / Iraq Arsenal
U.S. Behind the Lines / Iraq Military Misconduct

.774
.685
.774
.313
.774
.685
.618

U.S. Combat / Iraq Military
U.S. Combat / Iraq Troops
U.S. Combat / Iraq Patrol
U.S. Combat / Iraq Insurgents
U.S. Combat / Iraq POW
U.S. Combat / Iraq Arsenal
U.S. Combat / Iraq Military Misconduct

.865
.809
.865
.549
.865
.809
.767

U.S. Patrol / Iraq Military
U.S. Patrol / Iraq Troops
U.S. Patrol / Iraq Patrol
U.S. Patrol / Iraq Insurgents
U.S. Patrol / Iraq POW
U.S. Patrol / Iraq Arsenal
U.S. Patrol / Iraq Military Misconduct

.741
.640
.741
.245
.741
.640
.566

U.S. Military Wounded / Iraq Military
U.S. Military Wounded / Iraq Troops
U.S. Military Wounded / Iraq Patrol
U.S. Military Wounded / Iraq Insurgents
U.S. Military Wounded / Iraq POW
U.S. Military Wounded / Iraq Arsenal
U.S. Military Wounded / Iraq Military Misconduct

.834
.766
.834
.460
.834
.766
.715

U.S. Military Dead / Iraq Military
U.S. Military Dead / Iraq Troops
U.S. Military Dead / Iraq Patrol
U.S. Military Dead / Iraq Insurgents
U.S. Military Dead / Iraq POW
U.S. Military Dead / Iraq Arsenal
U.S. Military Dead / Iraq Military Misconduct

.845
.782
.845
.493
.845
.782
.735
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Table 4
Statistical Significance of Iraq War Categorical Relationships

Category

n = 356

df = 1

Chi Square*

U.S. Military Misconduct / Iraq Military
U.S. Military Misconduct / Iraq Troops
U.S. Military Misconduct / Iraq Patrol
U.S. Military Misconduct / Iraq Insurgents
U.S. Military Misconduct / Iraq POW
U.S. Military Misconduct / Iraq Arsenal
U.S. Military Misconduct / Iraq Military Misconduct

.839
.774
.839
.476
.839
.774
.725

U.S. Armaments / Iraq Military
U.S. Armaments / Iraq Troops
U.S. Armaments / Iraq Patrol
U.S. Armaments / Iraq Insurgents
U.S. Armaments / Iraq POW
U.S. Armaments / Iraq Arsenal
U.S. Armaments / Iraq Military Misconduct

.845
.782
.845
.493
.845
.782
.735

Allied Patrol / Iraq Military
Allied Patrol / Iraq Troops
Allied Patrol / Iraq Patrol
Allied Patrol / Iraq Insurgents
Allied Patrol / Iraq POW
Allied Patrol / Iraq Arsenal
Allied Patrol / Iraq Military Misconduct

.958
.940
.958
.852
.958
.940
.926

Allied Behind the Lines / Iraq Military
Allied Behind the Lines / Iraq Troops
Allied Behind the Lines / Iraq Patrol
Allied Behind the Lines / Iraq Insurgents
Allied Behind the Lines / Iraq POW
Allied Behind the Lines / Iraq Arsenal
Allied Behind the Lines / Iraq Military Misconduct

.926
.896
.926
.745
.926
.896
.873

Iraq Military / Iraq Civilians
Iraq Military / Iraq Civilian Wounded
Iraq Military / Iraq Civilian Dead

.693
.896
.905

Iraq Troops / Iraq Civilians
Iraq Troops / Iraq Civilian Wounded
Iraq Troops / Iraq Civilian Dead

.576
.853
.866

Iraq Patrol / Iraq Civilians
Iraq Patrol / Iraq Civilian Wounded
Iraq Patrol / Iraq Civilian Dead

.693
.896
.905
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Table 4
Statistical Significance of Iraq War Categorical Relationships

Category

n = 356

df = 1

Chi Square*

Iraq POWs / Iraq Civilians
Iraq POWs / Iraq Civilian Wounded
Iraq POWs / Iraq Civilian Dead

.693
.896
.905

Iraq Arsenal/ Iraq Civilians
Iraq Arsenal / Iraq Civilian Wounded
Iraq Arsenal / Iraq Civilian Dead

.576
.853
.866

Iraq Insurgents / Iraq Civilians
Iraq Insurgents / Iraq Civilian Wounded
Iraq Insurgents / Iraq Civilian Dead

.041*
.645
.674

Iraq Arsenal/ Iraq Civilians
Iraq Arsenal / Iraq Civilian Wounded
Iraq Arsenal / Iraq Civilian Dead

.576
.853
.866

Iraq Military Misconduct / Iraq Civilians
Iraq Military Misconduct / Iraq Civilian Wounded
Iraq Military Misconduct / Iraq Civilian Dead

.492
.820
.836

Iraq Military / Iraq Terrorism
Iraq Military / Iraq Terrorist
Iraq Military / Other Terrorism
Iraq Military / Other Terrorist

.896
.958
.958
.958

Iraq Troops / Iraq Terrorism
Iraq Troops / Iraq Terrorist
Iraq Troops / Other Terrorism
Iraq Troops / Other Terrorist

.853
.950
.940
.940

Iraq Patrol / Iraq Terrorism
Iraq Patrol / Iraq Terrorist
Iraq Patrol / Other Terrorism
Iraq Patrol / Other Terrorist

.896
.958
.958
.958
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Table 4
Statistical Significance of Iraq War Categorical Relationships

Category

n = 356

df = 1

Chi Square*

Iraq Insurgents / Iraq Terrorism
Iraq Insurgents / Iraq Terrorist
Iraq Insurgents / Other Terrorism
Iraq Insurgents / Other Terrorist

.645
.852
.000
.852

Iraq POWs / Iraq Terrorism
Iraq POWs / Iraq Terrorist
Iraq POWs / Other Terrorism
Iraq POWs / Other Terrorist

.896
.958
.958
.958

Iraq Arsenal / Iraq Terrorism
Iraq Arsenal / Iraq Terrorist
Iraq Arsenal / Other Terrorism
Iraq Arsenal / Other Terrorist

.853
.940
.940
.940

Iraq Military Misconduct / Iraq Terrorism
Iraq Military Misconduct / Iraq Terrorist
Iraq Military Misconduct / Other Terrorism
Iraq Military Misconduct / Other Terrorist

.820
.926
.926
.926

Destruction U.S. / Destruction Iraq
Destruction U.S. / Destruction Oil
Destruction Other / Destruction Iraq
Destruction Other / Destruction Oil

.725
.926
.684
.915

U.S. Military Misconduct / U.S. Military
U.S. Military Misconduct / U.S. Military Leader
U.S. Military Misconduct / U.S. Troops
U.S. Military Misconduct / U.S. Behind the Lines
U.S. Military Misconduct / U.S. Combat
U.S. Military Misconduct / U.S. Patrol
U.S. Military Misconduct / U.S. Military Wounded
U.S. Military Misconduct / U.S. Military Dead
U.S. Military Misconduct / U.S. Armaments

.839
.649
.516
.274
.516
.207
.423
.457
.457
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Table 5
High Frequency Categories in Gulf War Pictures in Newsmagazines2
_______________________________________________________________________
Category / Genre
Images
Percent
Arsenal (U.S., Allied)
Troops (Noncombat–U.S., Allied)
Political Leaders (U.S.: Bush)
Military Leaders (U.S.)
Political Leaders (Iraq: Hussein)
Arsenal (Iraq)
Combat (All nations)
Destruction (Iraq)
Media (U.S.)
Civilian life (U.S.)
POWs (U.S.–Allied)
Historical Photos

2

Table from Griffin and Lee’s study published in 1995.

249
158
80
59
47
40
38
37
36
36
32
31

23%
14%
7%
5%
4%
4%
3%
3%
3%
3%
3%
3%
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Table 6
Low Frequency Categories in Gulf War Pictures in Newsmagazines3
_______________________________________________________________________
Category / Genre
Images
Percent
Military Casualties
Damage and Destruction (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait)
Prisoners of War (Iraqi)
Political Leaders (Arab world, excluding Iraq)
Public Demonstrations (U.S.)
War Time Civilian Life (Kuwait)
Oil and Energy
Public Demonstrations (Arab)
Political Leaders (Soviet, Iranian, Chinese, U.N.)
Civilian Casualties (Iraqi)
Ecological Subjects
Palestinian Leaders, Activists, Protesters
War Time Civilian Life (Iraqi)
War Inflicted Damage and Destruction (Israel)
Civilian Casualties (Saudi, Kuwaiti, Israel)
Military Casualties (Iraqi)
Troops (Iraqi)
Wartime Civilian Life (Israel and Occupied Territory)
Iranian Activists or Protesters
Wartime Civilian Life (Saudi Arabia)
Public Demonstrations (Other Allied)
Military Casualties (Saudi, Egyptian, British, French)
Military Leaders (Iraqi)
Other

3

Table from Griffin and Lee’s study published in 1995.

27
27
22
19
19
19
15
14
13
13
12
10
8
7
6
6
5
5
4
2
1
1
0
7

2%
2%
2%
2%
2%
2%
1%
1%
1%
1%
1%
1%
1%
.6%
.5%
.5%
<.5%
<.5%
<.5%
<.5%
<.5%
<.5%
0%
.6%

